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ABSTRACT 
     We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play an internal corporate 
governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders in a cross-country sample of public firms. We draw our conclusion by 
examining the market reaction (in terms of bidder announcement period abnormal returns) to 
acquisition announcements made by firms with and without MLS in their ownership 
structure. Using an international sample of acquisition announcements made by firms with at 
least one large shareholder from 10 Western European and 5 East Asian countries between 
1996 and 2000, we find the presence of MLS, their voting rights, relative voting power, the 
number of blockholders and the relative voting power of these blockholders have a positive 
and significant impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. We also find that 
the legal institutions such as disclosure requirement, investor protection, common-law legal 
origin and anti-self-dealing have positive effects on bidder announcement period abnormal 
returns.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the collapse of a series of global giant companies, such as Enron and WorldCom, 
the world calls the increasing attention to the importance of corporate governance. Existing 
literature suggests that poor governance mechanisms (consequently high agency problems) 
are negatively associated with firm valuation (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009), 
profitability (Gompers et al., 2003) and bidder announcement period abnormal returns 
(Masulis et al., 2007). These studies primarily focus on agency problems between managers 
and shareholders, assuming ownership is dispersed among a large number of small 
shareholders. Only around the last two decades, empirical studies examine ultimate 
ownership and find that majority of the firms around the world have concentrated ownership 
(La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Holderness, 2009). 
These concentrated ownership firms are usually controlled by a dominant shareholder, who 
typically holds voting rights in excess of dividend rights. The dominant shareholder obtains 
control through various control enhancing mechanisms, such as pyramid structures, 
cross-shareholdings and dual class share structures. Some dominant shareholders also have 
related acquaintances serve in important positions of the management (Claessens et al., 2000). 
These firms thus have managerial incentives directly link with that of the dominant 
shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, the dominant shareholder has the incentives to 
monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Admati et al., 
1994; Burkart et al., 1997). Therefore, agency problems between managers and shareholders 
are largely mitigated in such firms. However, it is arguable that the controlling shareholder‟s 
interest may not represent the general interests of all shareholders. In particular, if the 
dividend rights of the controlling shareholder are not large enough or if there is a substantial 
gap between dividend rights and voting rights of the controlling shareholder, s/he may have 
incentives to extract private benefits at the cost of other shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Guedhami and Mishra, 2009). This creates another form of agency problems, which is the 
one between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.  
There are many ways for the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority 
shareholders. The controlling shareholder may divert corporate resource to her/him or 
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consume perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, s/he may buy corporate jets 
using the money from the firm for so-called business purpose. S/He may also sell the 
output/assets from the firm s/he controls to the firm s/he owns at below market prices. In that 
case, the cost of selling output/assets at low prices is shared by all shareholders while the 
benefit from this transaction is enjoyed by the controlling shareholder alone (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). In still other ways, s/he may assign unqualified relatives 
to serve in important managerial positions and pay them higher than expected remunerations 
(La Porta et al., 2000). Such agency problems are more severe in countries with poor legal 
institutions. On the contrary, strong legal institutions provide protections to investors by 
making the expropriation mechanism less efficient (La Porta et al., 2000). Hence, legal 
protection can alleviate such agency problems. Existing empirical studies confirm this 
argument by showing better investor protection is associated with higher firm values (La 
Porta et al., 2002), lower cost of equity capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 
2009; Chen et al., 2009), lower debt costs (Ellul et al., 2007) and better quality of financial 
reporting (Fan and Wong, 2005). One possible way for firms to compensate for the 
shortcomings of poor legal institutions is with the help of good internal governance 
mechanisms. 
On the other hand, empirical studies also show a large percentage of firms around the 
world, not only have single large shareholder (SLS), but also have other large shareholder(s) 
beyond the largest one (i.e. multiple large shareholders) (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008). This adds complexity to 
the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders as it is 
theoretically unclear what kind of role multiple large shareholders (MLS) play in the 
corporate governance of firms. They may have incentives similar to those of the controlling 
shareholder and thus collude with the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority 
shareholders together (Winton, 1993; Zwiebel, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998). On the 
contrary, in order to safeguard their own wealth, they may have the desire to monitor the 
activities of the controlling shareholder or compete with her/him for corporate control 
(Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). In order to do so, they may align 
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their interests with those of minority shareholders and gather enough votes to veto any 
value-destroying decisions at shareholder meetings. This shifts the voting outcome more 
towards the dispersed shareholders (Dhillon and Rossetto, 2009). Or they may form 
coalitions with other shareholders to obtain corporate control instead. Moreover, if they 
cannot stop the expropriation as they wish, they may turn to the market and trade 
aggressively on firm‟s shares and this drives down the stock price (Edmans and Manso, 
2011). The drop of the stock price, in turn, penalizes the behaviour of the controlling 
shareholder. In order to avoid such punishments, in firms with MLS, the dominant 
shareholder tends to behave and make decisions that represent general interests of majority 
shareholders. In that case, MLS can effectively play a corporate governance role to mitigate 
the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Current 
empirical studies favour the later argument that MLS are instrumental in alleviating agency 
problems using evidence from higher corporate valuation (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et 
al., 2009), lower cost of equity capital (Attig et al., 2008), reduced audit fees (Adelopo et al., 
2009) and higher risk taking (Mishra, 2011) with the presence of MLS. In this paper, using 
announcement period abnormal returns (CAR2) estimated following Masulis et al. (2007) for 
bidders from fifteen Western European and East Asian countries in acquisitions announced 
between 1996 and 2000, we examine whether the presence and the power of MLS are 
associated with bidder CAR2 to uncover the impact of MLS as perceived by the market. We 
choose to examine the valuation effect of the merger and acquisition decision as it is one of 
the most important decisions that a firm needs to make. It generally requires the active 
participation of all decision makers, including shareholder approvals (Moeller, 2005). The 
shareholders have rights to vote for or against the acquisition proposal. In addition, the effect 
of the corporate governance structure on shareholder wealth can be detected through bidder 
announcement period abnormal returns within a short time period. This facilitates us to 
explore the role of MLS in an observable manner.   
In comparing the bidder CAR2 between firms with MLS and firms with SLS, we find 
market reacts positively to acquisition announcements made by the MLS bidders. This 
suggests that the presence of MLS may be associated with an effective corporate governance 
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role in mitigating the agency problems that prevail in SLS firms. Indeed, we find that the 
positive impact of the presence of MLS, their power and relative power on bidder CAR2 
continue to prevail after we control for proxies for bidder characteristics, deal characteristics, 
industry characteristics, external governance mechanisms, year fixed effects and country 
fixed effects. Our evidence is also robust to accounting for industry fixed effects, different 
proxies for control variables, country, industry and bidder clustering, different event windows, 
degree of investor protection for the target‟s country, different estimation windows and 
methods for estimating announcement abnormal returns and potential endogeneity problems. 
Hence, we conclude that MLS play a corporate governance role in mitigating agency 
problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders as evident from 
announcement period abnormal returns for bidders.  
Our study relates to Masulis et al. (2007) as we also examine the market reaction to 
investment decisions by firms with different corporate governance mechanisms using merger 
and acquisitions. Masulis et al. (2007) use the number of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) as a 
proxy for internal corporate governance. They argue that the presence of more ATPs is 
associated with higher agency problems. Thus, ATPs are proxies for poor internal corporate 
governance mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009). By studying the 
domestic takeovers in the United States, they find that a larger number of ATPs has a 
negative impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. That is, market reacts 
negatively to acquisition announcements made by firms with poor corporate governance 
mechanisms. Our study differs from Masulis et al. (2007) as we examine market reaction to 
acquisition announcements made by the firms with a different proxy for internal corporate 
governance --- the presence of MLS in the bidder‟s ownership structure and their power. We 
show that the presence of MLS, their power and their relative power have a positive and 
significant impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. This essentially implies 
MLS play a positive governance role, and therefore mitigate the agency problems between 
the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. This allows us to contribute to the 
existing merger and acquisition literature by introducing a different proxy for internal 
corporate governance. The study of MLS in the ownership structure also allows us to 
 5 
complement to the existing ownership structure literature, especially the literature related to 
MLS ownership structures. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
international study that investigates the role of MLS using merger and acquisition activities. 
Some studies also examine acquisitions that have an international focus. They mainly 
concentrate on cross-border deals (Bris et al., 2008) and emerging–market multinationals 
(Aybar and Ficici, 2009). They examine the relationship of cross-border mergers and firm 
value as well as the effects of external governance transfers. By having our study on a 
cross-country (Western Europe and East Asia in our case) setting, we further explore the 
effect of country-level determinants of merger gains, such as the degree of investor protection. 
Our study thus makes contribution to the existing investor protection literature as well. 
The rest of the thesis is organized in seven different sections. Section 2 reviews prior 
literature related to bidder announcement returns, corporate governance mechanisms and 
ownership structure. Section 3 presents the development of our main hypotheses with regards 
to proxies for the presence and the power of MLS. Section 4 describes our sample, bidder 
announcement returns estimation, test variables and control variables. Section 5 discusses the 
properties of our variables, univariate tests as well as the results of multivariate tests. Section 
6 presents robustness tests and section 7 concludes the thesis.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Bidder Announcement Returns 
Current empirical studies regarding corporate governance mechanisms mainly focus on 
their impact on firm valuation, profitability and stock performance. There are some recent 
studies that examine their effects on mergers and acquisitions. Gompers et al. (2003) 
construct a governance index (G-index) based on the 24 antitakeover provisions (ATPs) 
published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and examine the impact of 
their use on corporate performance in the United States. They form a “Dictatorship Portfolio” 
with weakest shareholder rights (more ATPs) firms and a “Democracy Portfolio” with 
strongest shareholder rights (fewer ATPs) firms and find that an investment strategy of 
longing the “Democracy Portfolio” and shorting the “Dictatorship Portfolio” generates 
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substantial long-term abnormal returns. Their results also show firms with more ATPs (hence 
poorer corporate governance) are associated with lower firm value, profitability and sales 
growth. Similar to Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009) further select the 6 most 
important ATPs out of the 24 ATPs and construct the entrenchment index (E-Index). They 
also discover a negative relationship between the use of the E-index and firm value as well as 
long-term stock abnormal returns. According to Gompers et al. (2003), ATPs cause higher 
agency costs “through some combination of inefficient investment, reduced operational 
efficiency, or self-dealing” (p. 131). Masulis et al. (2007) thus examine the impact of the use 
of ATPs on a firm‟s investment efficiency, and particularly, shareholder wealth effects of 
firms‟ new acquisitions. They propose ATP value destruction hypothesis, claiming that 
“managers protected by more ATPs are more likely to indulge in value-destroying 
acquisitions since they are less likely to be disciplined for taking such actions by the market 
for corporate control” (Masulis et al., 2007, p. 1853). Their finding shows acquirers with 
more ATPs generate lower acquirer announcement returns than acquirers with fewer ATPs. 
This lends support to their ATP value destruction hypothesis, implying market reacts 
negatively to acquisition announcements made by the firms with poor internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. Moeller et al. (2004) suggest that bidder abnormal returns are also 
affected by the size of the bidder. Large bidders have lower bidder abnormal returns than 
small bidders. This is in accordance with the hubris hypothesis proposed by Roll (1986), who 
finds generally larger acquirers tend to pay higher takeover premium and generate negative 
dollar synergies during acquisitions. An alternative rationale to this negative relation between 
bidder size and bidder abnormal returns is that large firms are less likely to be takeover 
targets later (as it will require more resources to acquire them). Therefore, large bidder size 
serves as a takeover defence, which is similar to the function of ATPs. Using a sample of 
acquisition announcements made by U.S. banks, Piskula (2011) also finds evidence that 
market reacts negatively to acquisition announcements made by the bidders with weaker 
firm-level corporate governance. In addition, Wang and Xie (2009) argue that an acquisition 
is usually accompanied by a change in corporate control, which results in the replacement of 
the target‟s corporate governance by acquirer‟s corporate governance. “When the acquirer 
has stronger shareholders rights than the target, the change in control will result in an 
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improvement in corporate governance at the target. Such an acquisition leads to a better use 
of target assets and creates more value” (Wang and Xie, 2009, p. 830). More shareholder 
rights are associated with better corporate governance as they better protect shareholders 
against any actions that may hurt latter‟s benefits. When poorly managed targets are acquired 
by well-managed (good corporate governance) bidders, targets enjoy the benefits from the 
change in control. This synergistic effect of acquisitions is perceived positively by the market, 
leading to higher abnormal returns of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target 
(Wang and Xie, 2009). Besides, their results show the synergistic gain is also shared by both 
the bidder shareholders and the target shareholders as both the bidder‟s and the target‟s 
abnormal returns increase with the increase in the difference in shareholder rights of the two 
firms. Similarly, Leverty and Qian (2010), who also study the synergistic effect, illustrate the 
importance of the efficiency difference of the acquirer and the target to shareholder wealth of 
both firms. As the efficiency difference increases, both the bidder and the target benefit from 
the acquisition as the bidder enjoys higher announcement period abnormal returns while the 
target gets higher takeover premium.  
Apart from the corporate governance studies that cover the U.S. mergers only, some 
studies examine bidder returns and corporate governance on an international setting. A 
majority of these studies often examine cross-border mergers and acquisitions. That is, the 
bidder and the target are from two difference nations. In addition to the traditional benefits 
provided by domestic mergers, one important factor that motivates cross-border mergers is 
the benefit from governance-related differences across countries (Erel et al., 2011). A merger 
may happen if the combined firm has better protection for shareholders of the target firm 
because of the higher governance standards in the country of the bidder. Hence, the role of 
legal system plays a crucial part in shaping cross-border mergers (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; 
Bris et al., 2008). The target becomes a national of the country of the bidder in a cross-border 
merger, which implies a change in investor protection as the law from the acquirer‟s country 
applies to the newly merged firm after the merger (Bris et al., 2008). Bris et al. (2008) thus 
test whether the change in investor protection affects value, with industry Tobin‟s Q as the 
proxy. When investors are better protected by the legal system, they are more willing to get 
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involved in financing firms, which leads to broader financial markets (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Empirically, better shareholder protection is also associated with higher corporate valuation 
(La Porta et al., 2002). On the other hand, if the legal protection for investors is poor, 
corporate insiders enjoy greater freedom to make decisions that may not maximize firm value 
(Wurgler, 2000) such as making value-destroying acquisitions.
1
 This results in higher agency 
problems. Thus, poor shareholder protection is usually associated with high cost of equity 
capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009), poor quality of financial 
reporting (Fan and Wong, 2005) and low corporate risk taking (John et al., 2008; Mishra, 
2011). With cross-border mergers, Bris et al. (2008) find when a firm from a country with 
good investor protection acquires a firm from a country with poor investor protection, the 
industry Tobin‟s Q of the bidder is not affected while the industry Tobin‟s Q of target 
increases. In fact, Rossi and Volpin (2004) show target firms enjoy better degree of investor 
protection after being acquired by firms from stronger investor protection regions. Therefore, 
targets are typically from countries with poorer investor protection than the bidders in 
cross-border mergers. Similarly, Erel et al. (2011) also show firms in countries with higher 
stock market valuations tend to be the bidders while firms from weaker-performing countries 
tend to be the targets. By restricting the targets from U.S. only, Kuipers et al. (2009) examine 
the incentive mechanisms created by legal environment and corporate governance structure 
from foreign acquirers. Their results show both the bidder and portfolio returns (combined 
returns for the bidder and the target) are positively related to the degree of investor protection 
and legal environment of the bidder. All these studies suggest better investor protection 
(better external governance) brings in values for cross-border mergers.  
2.2 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure 
Berle and Means (1932) point out that the stock ownership is widely dispersed among 
different stockholders in many large companies in the United States. Control over the 
corporate wealth thus lies less in the same hands and can be exercised with or without any 
stock ownership. “Ownership of wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth 
without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development” 
                                                          
1
 Corporate insiders here refer to managers, controlling shareholders or anyone that controls the firm. 
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(Berle and Means, 1932, p. 69). This outlines an image of widely held corporations where 
dividend rights are dispersed among small shareholders while control rights are rested in the 
hands of professional managers, who do not have substantial dividend benefits from the 
corporations. This image has been well received by many scholars. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) develop their theory of ownership structure of the firm based on widely held 
corporations. Jensen and Meckling are also among the first ones to define the concept of 
agency costs, implying there are always costs in solving the conflicts between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (managers). Agency problems arise because corporate decisions are 
made by managers on behalf of the shareholders and these two parties may not have the same 
perspectives. Thus, managers do not always act in the best interests of the shareholders. In 
particular, managers have the incentives to expropriate shareholders without incurring 
substantial costs by themselves (as they do not have substantial residual claims over the 
firm‟s assets). For instance, the manager may decide to buy raw materials from a supplier 
who charges a price that is higher than the market price. This supplier, for example, could be 
a friend of the manager or may give certain portion of the transaction value as commission 
back to the manager. In this way, the manger enjoys all the benefits from directing the 
transaction to this supplier while shareholders end up bearing most of the costs of paying a 
high price to the supplier. One way to mitigate these agency problems between shareholders 
and managers is to “grant a manager a highly contingent, long term incentive contract ex 
ante to align his interests with those of investors” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 744). When 
managers have larger residual claims over the firm‟s assets, they have larger incentives to 
make decisions that are for the sake of the firm as they are now also the major beneficiaries. 
The managers with higher equity stake (larger residual claims) bear higher costs than those 
with trivial equity stake if the firm does not perform well. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest such management ownership is a good way to reduce agency costs arising from the 
principal-agent conflicts discussed above. They also recognize the important role of the legal 
system as “statutory laws sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and 
organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p. 311). La Porta et al. (2000) advise legal system protects shareholders by making the 
expropriation technology less efficient. When there is no investor protection, managers have 
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unrestricted power to extract private benefits. As investor protection improves, managers 
intending to expropriate have to divert some of their attention to set up extraction channels so 
as to make the diversion less observable by shareholders. With very good investor protection, 
the most they can do is just to overpay themselves and put their acquaintances in managerial 
positions etc. (La Porta et al., 2000).  
About three decades ago, scholars began to question the validity of the image of the 
widely held corporations. In particular, Demsetz (1983) argues ownership is not necessarily 
separated from control. In addition, even managers, especially top executives, may share 
firm‟s profits by receiving stock-based compensations. Shliefer and Vishny (1986) study a 
sample of 456 Fortune 500 firms and find 354 of them have at least one shareholder owning 
at least 5% of the dividend rights and the largest shareholder, on average, owns 15.4% of the 
dividend rights of the firm. A good number of these large shareholders are families and 
financial firms. Morck et al. (1988) uncover a significant management ownership using a 
similar sample of Fortune 500 firms in 1980. Board members own more than 10% of the 
equity stake for 31% of the firms in the sample and own more than 20% of the equity stake 
for 20% of the firms in the sample. Several recent empirical studies on ultimate ownership 
further show strong evidences in contrast to the dispersed ownership theory.
2
 An 
examination of the 20 largest public firms in each of the 27 wealthy countries around the 
world, La Porta et al. (1999) show a large percentage (two-thirds in the full sample) of the 
corporations nowadays are not widely held, except in the countries with strong investor 
protections.
3
 Most of these firms are controlled either by families or the state, while family 
control is more prominent. These controlling shareholders typically hold voting rights in 
excess of dividend rights. Controls are obtained mainly through the use of pyramid 
                                                          
2
 We follow the definition of “ultimate ownership” from La Porta et al. (1999) that it relies on “voting rights 
rather than cash-flow rights” (p.467). In the case of indirect ownership, cash-flow (dividend) rights are 
calculated as the product of the ownership stakes along the chain while voting rights are obtained through the 
weakest link along the control chain. 
3
 They suggest the likelihood of widely dispersed ownership is the greatest at largest firms in the richest 
economies. We follow the definition of “widely held” from La Porta et al. (1999) that a firm is widely held if 
“there is no controlling shareholder” (p.478). A firm is said to have a controlling shareholder “if the sum of a 
shareholder‟s direct and indirect voting rights exceeds an arbitrary cut-off value, which, alternatively, is 20 
percent or 10 percent” (p.478). 
 11 
structures.
4
 The deviation from one-share one-vote tends to be small. This means the use of 
dual class share structure to enhance control is not substantial. Very few of the firms (except 
those in Austria and Germany) use cross-shareholdings to enhance control. In the case of 
family controlled firms, controls are also enhanced through the participation in management. 
Family members hold important positions of management in at least 69% of the family 
controlled firms. The presence of concentration of ownership with voting rights in excess of 
dividend rights is also confirmed by two studies covering 9 East Asian countries (Claessens 
et al., 2000) and 13 Western European countries (Faccio and Lang, 2002).
5
 Specifically, 
Claessens et al. (2000) study the public corporations in 9 East Asian countries and report 
two-thirds of the sample firms are controlled by single shareholder. More than half of the 
sample firms are family controlled while state control is significant in Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The control is enhanced typically through the use of 
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings in all these East Asian countries in the sample. 
Again, controlling families typically participate in management of the firm. Faccio and Lang 
(2002) study a sample of corporations in 13 Western European countries and report that a 
large proportion of the firms (63.07%) feature a dominant large shareholder, which is mostly 
controlled by family (44.29%). Most firms in Western Europe use dual class share structures 
and pyramid structures to enhance the voting power of the largest shareholder. Furthermore, 
Morck et al. (2005) analyze large firms outside the United States and the United Kingdom 
and find they normally have controlling owners who are usually very wealthy families. 
Pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings and dual class share structures allow these families to 
obtain and enhance controls without making comparable capital investments to the firms. 
More recent empirical evidence suggests controlling families participate in 
management in more than half of the family controlled firms (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens 
et al., 2000). This suggests a lack of separation of ownership and management in these firms 
as controlling families often serve in important positions in the management of the firms they 
                                                          
4
 There are different ways to obtain or enhance controls of a firm. Commonly-known methods are the use of 
pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings, dual class share structures (use of shares with superior voting rights, 
which is represented by the deviation of one-share one-vote) and participation in management.  
5
 Although the East Asian study covers regions that are not exactly a country (i.e. Hong Kong), we still refer it 
as a country (and thereafter) for expositional convenience. 
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control. Even when controlling shareholders do not participate in management, controlling 
shareholders have the incentives to monitor managers‟ activities as they suffer the most if 
managers make sub-optimal or value destroying decisions. Thus, these controlling 
shareholders can play an effective monitoring role or they can facilitate third party takeovers 
to replace the incumbent management if they think the managers are incompetent (Shliefer 
and Vishny, 1986). This role of the large shareholder helps mitigate the agency problems 
between managers and shareholders to a large extent as the controlling shareholder 
essentially controls the management. However, notice that the interests of the controlling 
shareholder may not represent the general interests of minority shareholders and more so 
because the controlling shareholder typically holds voting rights in excess of dividend rights 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Separation of 
ownership and control thus takes a different form from the type of firms described in Berle 
and Means (1932).
6
 The deviation of control rights from dividend rights gives the controlling 
shareholder incentives to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. For 
instance, law may permit the controlling shareholder to sell assets from the firm s/he controls 
to another firm s/he owns at a price that is much lower than the market price. In this way, the 
controlling shareholder enjoys the full benefits from the transaction (through the firm that 
s/he owns) while the costs of transfer pricing are shared by all the shareholders of the firm 
s/he controls. Moreover, the controlling shareholder can place incapable acquaintances in 
managerial positions or overpay the executives that s/he knows well (La Porta et al., 2000). 
As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the fundamental agency problems are not between 
shareholders and managers any more, but rather, are between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders in firms with a controlling shareholder. La Porta et al. (2000) point out 
investor protection is crucial because of the existence of potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholder. When laws better protect the rights of 
shareholders, they are willing to pay more to finance the firm as they know “more of the 
                                                          
6
 In the type of firms described by Berle and Means (1932), stock ownership is rested in the hands of 
shareholders while controls are rested in the hands of professional managers, who do not have substantial equity 
ownership from the corporation. However, in the type of firms described by La Porta et al. (1999), Classenes et 
al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002), stock ownership is dispersed among different shareholders while 
controls are rested in the hands of the controlling shareholder, who often has control rights in excess of his/her 
dividend rights.   
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firm’s profits would come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to being 
expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the firm” (La Porta et al., 2002, p. 1147). 
Improving shareholder rights can thus lead to the higher valuation of the firm (La Porta et al., 
2002) through the improved corporate governance. On the other hand, in economies with 
poor investor protection, the controlling shareholder has the opportunities to expropriate 
efficiently (La Porta et al., 2000). This is also why poor investor protection is usually 
associated with higher cost of equity capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 
2009), poorer quality of financial reporting (Fan and Wong, 2005) and lower corporate risk 
taking (John et al., 2008; Mishra, 2011). Nevertheless, Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris 
and Raviv (1988) both suggest when the controlling shareholder retains substantial dividend 
rights in addition to control rights, s/he faces stronger incentives to monitor managers to have 
the firm run properly. Likewise, when the controlling shareholder has higher dividend rights, 
expropriation becomes more costly as doing so will lower her/his wealth eventually. This is 
exactly the incentive effect of managerial ownership proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Indeed, Claessens et al. (2002) separate the effects of increasing control rights (leads 
to entrenchment effect) and dividend rights (leads to incentive effect) on firm value in 8 East 
Asian countries and find firm value increases with dividend rights while decreases with 
control rights. Additionally, La Porta et al. (2002) show although poor investor protection is 
penalized with lower firm valuation, higher equity ownership by the controlling shareholder 
helps to improve firm valuation.    
While taking a closer look at the pattern of the ownership structure of the firms with a 
controlling shareholder, it is not hard to uncover the existence of other large shareholders, 
who also have significant dividend and voting rights in the firms besides the controlling 
shareholder and we call this MLS structure.
7
 Particularly, Faccio and Lang (2002) show the 
controlling shareholder of 53.99% of the non-widely held firms is “alone”.8 In other words, 
about 44% of the firms featuring a dominant shareholder have at least two large shareholders. 
                                                          
7
 Follow La Porta et al. (2002), we refer a shareholder as “large” if the sum of its voting rights, both direct and 
indirect, is equal to or larger than 10%.  
8
 According to Faccio and Lang (2002), “a controlling shareholder is said to be „alone‟ if no other owner 
controls at least 10% of the voting rights” (p. 388). 
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Similarly, Attig et al. (2008) study listed corporations with at least one large shareholder from 
East Asia and Western Europe and record MLS ownership structures exist in 44% of the 
sample firms. Laeven and Levine (2008) show one-third of the publicly listed firms (both 
widely held and non-widely held) in Europe have MLS. 
The presence of MLS in ownership structure adds complexity to the classical agency 
problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders as it is theoretically 
not clear how these MLS behave. On one hand, the alignment of interest hypothesis suggests 
MLS may collude with the dominant shareholder for corporate control and extract private 
benefits together (Winton, 1993; Zwiebel, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998). Winton (1993) 
shows when the largest shareholder has sufficient incentives (large equity stake) to monitor 
managers‟ activities, it is always most efficient to have only one shareholder monitor. 
Increase in the number of shareholders reduces the effectiveness of monitoring because of the 
free rider problem. Zwiebel (1995) develops a theoretical model using game theory to show 
the dynamics of shareholder structure across firms. In particular, the model shows the 
presence of a large controlling shareholder tends to discourage other large shareholders to 
invest in the firm. In cases when firms do not have such a large controlling shareholder, they 
are more likely to have a number of moderate-sized shareholders, who tend to join together to 
form controlling coalitions and receive divisible private benefits from partial control. 
Likewise, MLS, who may have similar incentives as those of the dominant shareholder, tend 
to lean to the dominant shareholder in order to enjoy benefits from partial control. For 
instance, they can easily appoint their relatives to managerial positions by exercising their 
control. This collusion is more likely when the deviation of voting rights from dividend rights 
of the alliance is large as such an alliance has “the incentives (small cash-flow rights) and 
ability (sufficient voting rights) to divert corporate resources for private gain” (Laeven and 
Levine, 2008, p. 580). Kahn and Winton (1998) analyze the behaviour of institutional 
investors who have insider information (informed investors) and argue it is possible for these 
institutional investors to form coalition to obtain a large position of the firm‟s shares. When 
they see the firm‟s stock does poorly and not reflect existing information, they can buy 
additional shares, thus attracting uninformed investors to invest in the firm and boosting the 
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share prices. In that case, they benefit from the increase of share prices with both their 
existing and new shares. When they foresee the firm is going to perform poorly, these 
institutional investors may also short sell the shares in order to profit from selling at a 
relatively high price. In our case, MLS may behave as these institutional investors to collude 
together to obtain a large position of the firm‟s share and profit from different intervention 
mechanisms. The efficient monitoring hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests MLS may help 
limit expropriation by the dominant shareholder through the creation of valuable internal 
monitoring (Noe, 2002; Oded and Wang, 2010). One way to perform efficient monitoring is 
to form different coalitions to compete for corporate control (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue “the founder of the 
firm can optimally choose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force 
them to form coalitions to obtain control” (p.113). The alignment effect indicates the 
controlling coalition should have greater dividend rights to reduce the incentives to extract 
private benefits (Gutierrez and Tribo, 2004) while the coalition formation effect implies the 
winning coalition is more likely to be formed with minimized dividend rights as such a 
coalition has higher incentives to extract private benefits. The conflict between these two 
effects (alignment effect and coalition formation effect) suggests the best ownership structure 
is the one with large shareholders of roughly the same size and smaller gap between voting 
and dividend rights so as to avoid the situation that the winning coalition has relatively small 
dividend benefits. Bloch and Hege (2001) examine a model with two large shareholders and a 
group of small shareholders. They argue such an ownership structure can limit rent extraction. 
Since both large shareholders want to attract votes from minority shareholders to support 
their proposed strategies, they may pledge to limit the private benefit they take. When the 
control power of the two large shareholders is more equal, they are more likely to sacrifice 
more rents (private benefits) to obtain the support from minority shareholders. Hence, the 
rent extraction is more likely to be minimized. In our case, MLS may align their interests 
with those of minority shareholders to compete with the dominant shareholder in order to 
safeguard their own wealth and avoid it being expropriated by the dominant shareholder. So 
as to attract more voting rights, MLS may even sacrifice some of their own private benefits, 
such as paying a positive price for votes from minority shareholders (Nenova, 2003). Facing 
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the pressure from MLS, the dominant shareholder may do the same in order to remain in the 
controlling position. Such control contests effectively restrict the power of the dominant 
shareholder to extract private benefits arbitrarily. In theory, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) 
suggest an ownership structure with shareholders of roughly the same size is optimal. Bloch 
and Hege (2001) show two large shareholders do not extract private benefits because they 
compete for effective corporate control. Moreover, even if a large shareholder is not 
competing for corporate control, s/he may have one or more positions in the board. Thus, s/he 
is more likely to use such position(s) to monitor the behaviour of the controlling shareholder 
and vote for corporate decisions that are of her/his best interests (Mishra, 2011). In the event 
that MLS fail to prevent the expropriation from the controlling shareholder, they can turn to 
the market and trade aggressively to compete for profit, which drives down the stock price 
(Edmans and Manso, 2011). Edmans and Manso (2011) demonstrate MLS structure can be 
efficient through the trading mechanism. When large shareholders feel managers are making 
decisions that do not enhance firm value (shareholders are being expropriated by these 
decisions), they trade aggressively to profit from selling their shares at a relatively high price 
instead of waiting their shares to go down with the decrease of firm value because of the 
mangers‟ decisions. Such action drives down the stock price and penalizes managers‟ 
behaviour by injecting negative information into stock prices. In firms with large 
shareholders, managers understand those large shareholders will take advantage of trading to 
profit if managers make decisions that hurt shareholders‟ interests. Therefore, managers try to 
make best decisions possible to avoid being penalized through the trading mechanism. Large 
shareholders in these firms thus indirectly monitor managers‟ behaviour. We argue the 
dominant shareholder acts like those managers. In order to prevent from being punished for 
her/his self-fulfilling decisions, s/he tends to make decisions that are of the interests of 
majority shareholders. Other studies, such as Pagano and Röell (1998), argue MLS reduce 
expropriation through cross-monitoring. Furthermore, Gomes and Novaes (1999) and Dhillon 
and Rossetto (2009) provide alternative explanations, other than efficient monitoring, to 
support the corporate governance role played by MLS. Gomes and Novaes (1999) argue 
sharing control among MLS prevents the dominant shareholder from taking unilateral actions 
that might hurt the others. MLS can have disagreements on major corporate decisions, 
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creating bargaining problems. Although these ex-post bargaining problems may block some 
efficient decisions, they can also avoid harmful corporate decisions, especially in firms with 
significant overinvestment problems and large financing requirements (Gomes and Novaes, 
2006). Dhillon and Rossetto (2009) relax the assumption that the founder of the firm has the 
discretion in deciding the ownership structure and argue the establishment of different 
ownership structures depends on the entrepreneur‟s needs to raise additional capital. 
Shareholders have endogenous preferences towards certain investment choices depending on 
the size of their stake. The initial owner, who has large stake of the firm, holds an 
undiversified portfolio and hence favours investment choices that are less risky. Minority 
shareholders, however, have small stakes in the firms and prefer higher returns. This creates 
endogenous conflicts of interests between the large shareholder and minority shareholders. In 
order to guarantee that the firm invests in projects that have higher risk/returns, some 
investors may continue buying more stake and thus become second largest (or more) 
shareholders. Although their risk/return preference will decrease along with the amount of 
stake they own, their actions shift the voting outcome more towards higher risk/returns 
projects. This, in turn, benefits minority shareholders. Empirically, Maury and Pajuste (2005), 
Laeven and Levine (2008) and Attig et al. (2009) show MLS have a positive effect on firm 
value in Finland, Western Europe and East Asia, respectively. Attig et al. (2008) reveal a 
decreased implied cost of equity capital with the presence of MLS and the effectiveness of 
MLS monitoring reduces with the presence of uneven distribution of control rights among 
large shareholders. Mishra (2011) finds that higher corporate risk taking, usually indicating 
value-enhancing investment choice, is associated with the presence of the MLS structure. 
Nagar et al. (2010) find better firm performance with the presence of MLS using data from 
closely-held corporations. Bharath et al. (2010) find support that blockholders‟ ability to exit 
can be a powerful governance mechanism, supporting the arguments in Edmans and Manso 
(2011). All these lend support to the argument that MLS play an efficient corporate 
governance role in mitigating the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders. However, Faccio et al. (2001) test the effect of MLS on dividends and 
find MLS mitigate expropriation in Europe (due to monitoring) while exacerbate it in Asia 
(due to collusion). 
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
     Recent literature suggests a large percentage of corporations around the world have a 
controlling shareholder in the ownership structures. In such corporations, the controlling 
shareholder typically holds voting rights in excess of dividend rights (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et Lang, 2002). The excess voting rights in relation to the 
dividend rights give the controlling shareholder the power (significant voting rights) and 
incentives to extract private benefits at the expense of other shareholders, especially when 
these incentives are substantial (deviation of the voting rights from dividend rights is large). 
Therefore, the fundamental type of agency problems is not the one between shareholders and 
managers in many of these firms. Instead, it is between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, prior studies reveal that 
besides the controlling shareholder, there are also other large shareholders, who have 
significant dividend and voting rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; 
Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008). This makes the classical agency problems 
between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders complicated as it is 
theoretically unclear how these MLS behave. The alignment of interest hypothesis suggests 
MLS may have similar incentives to the dominant shareholder. In order to extract private 
benefits together, MLS may collude with the dominant shareholder and expropriate minority 
shareholders (Winton, 1993; Zwiebel, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998). Previous studies show 
market reacts negatively to acquisition announcements made by the firms with poor internal 
corporate governance (Masulis et al., 2007; Piskula, 2011), yet positively to acquisition 
announcements that create synergistic gains through governance transfer (Wang and Xie, 
2009). In our case, we can examine the effect of the presence of MLS through the market 
reactions to acquisition announcements made by firms. When MLS collude with the 
dominant shareholder, they do not help to alleviate the original agency problems between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. In other words, the presence of MLS 
ownership structure does not result in an improvement in the corporate governance. Hence, 
when these firms make acquisitions, market views it as a means for these large shareholders 
to remain in control and maximize private benefits at the cost of minority shareholders. 
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Therefore, market does not react positively to these acquisition announcements, or even, 
reacts negatively as these acquisitions will not create value for all shareholders (including 
minority shareholders). On the other hand, the efficient monitoring hypothesis suggests MLS 
may enhance internal monitoring by forming coalitions to monitor or compete for corporate 
control (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). Even if the large 
shareholders do not intend to compete for control, they may have one or more positions in the 
board. This also allows them to disagree on any value-destroying decisions, such as by 
avoiding poor quality lower risk projects, to protect themselves from being expropriated by 
the dominant shareholder (Mishra, 2011). Moreover, they may exert indirect monitoring 
through trading mechanism (Edmans and Manso, 2011) or shift the voting outcomes more 
towards minority shareholders (Dhillon and Rossetto, 2009). These MLS can thus effectively 
play a corporate governance role and market perceives bidders with such MLS in the 
ownership structure have strong corporate governance. When these bidders make acquisition 
announcements, market perceives that these acquisitions will create synergistic gain, leading 
a positive effect on the bidder announcement returns. Empirical studies generally support this 
corporate governance role played by MLS (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 
2008; Attig et al., 2008; 2009; Mishra, 2011).  
In order to test how MLS behave, we create different ownership structure variables in 
relation to the presence of MLS (Presence1, Presence2 and Presence2345) as well as their 
power in shaping corporate decisions (Vote2, Vote2/1, Vote2345, Vote2345/1 and High_diff) 
following Attig et al. (2008; 2009) and Mishra (2011). We refer a shareholder as “large” if 
the sum of her/his voting rights, both direct and indirect, is equal to or larger than 10% (La 
Porta et al., 2002). If no shareholder has voting rights of at least 10%, the firm is then 
classified as widely-held. We extract ownership structure information for East Asian 
countries from Claessens et al. (2000), who provide the dividend rights of the ultimate largest 
shareholder, voting rights of up to the fifth ultimate largest shareholders, methods of gaining 
control and information related to participation in management obtained in 1996. However, 
there is no information regarding dividend rights of other large shareholders beyond the 
largest one. According to Claessens et al. (2000), control of the firm is enhanced through 
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pyramid structures and cross-holdings among firms in all East Asian countries. Therefore, the 
other control method, namely dual class share structure is not applicable for the East Asian 
sample. We extract ownership structure information for Western European countries from 
Faccio and Lang (2002), which provides dividend rights and voting rights of up to the fifth 
ultimate largest shareholders, methods of gaining control, incomplete information related to 
participation in management and so forth obtained for the period from 1996 to the end of 
1999. According to La Porta et al. (1999), ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable. 
Therefore, using ownership data from different years will not be an issue in our study. Based 
on this ownership structure information, we create the following two sets of variables (as well 
as associated hypotheses) that are of our interest following Attig et al. (2008; 2009) and 
Mishra (2011): 
i) Presence1, Presence2 & Presence2345  
This set of variables identifies the pattern of the bidder‟s ownership structure. 
Presence1 takes the value of “1” for firms with a dominant shareholder with at least 10% 
voting rights and “0” for firms that are widely held. It identifies firms with a controlling 
shareholder in the ownership structure. Whether the market reacts positively or negatively to 
acquisition announcements made by the firms with the presence of a dominant shareholder is 
debatable. On one hand, the dominant shareholder has the incentive to monitor the activity of 
the manager and make sure that the decisions that the managers make will not hurt the 
dominant shareholder‟s interest. This helps to reduce the agency problems between 
shareholders and managers, which leads to positive reactions from the market (Shliefer and 
Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, minority shareholders are subject to expropriations from 
the dominant shareholder (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997). The dominant shareholder has 
incentives to expropriate other shareholders, especially when the separation of dividend rights 
and voting rights is substantial. This creates the agency problems between the dominant 
shareholder and minority shareholders and leads to negative reactions from the market. The 
situation is even worst in weak investor protection environments as the dominant shareholder 
enjoys greater flexibility and freedom to extract private benefits. This is also why firms with 
a dominant shareholder are often associated with lower firm value, especially in poor investor 
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protection economies (La Porta et al., 2000; 2002). However, it is theoretically unclear 
whether the impact of the dominant shareholder on mitigating agency problems between 
managers and shareholders is larger than the consequential agency problems between the 
dominant shareholder and minority shareholders. If the extent of agency problems mitigated 
is higher than the agency problems created by the presence of the dominant shareholder, we 
expect Presence1 to be positively associated with bidder CAR2. However, if it turns out 
otherwise, we expect Presence1 to be negatively associated with bidder CAR2. In summary, 
we make no prediction about the market reactions to acquisition announcements made by the 
bidders featuring Presence1.  
Presence2 takes the value of “1” for firms that have a second largest shareholder with 
at least 10% voting rights and “0”, otherwise. This is our main test variable as it identifies a 
MLS structure in the firm. The two competing arguments of the role of MLS suggest either 
sign (positive or negative) is possible. If large shareholders intend to compete for control, 
they will help restrict the ability of the dominant shareholder to extract private benefit. MLS 
will also vote against any potential value-destroying decisions in order to protect their own 
wealth from being expropriated by the dominant shareholder. In this case, the presence of the 
second largest shareholder (regardless whether there are more than two or just exactly two 
large shareholders) is associated with an effective corporate governance role (Gomes and 
Novaes, 1999; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). When firms 
featuring MLS in ownership structure make acquisitions, market may perceive these as 
strategic moves for potential synergetic gains for the combined firms, which in turns creates 
value for all shareholders. Therefore, market is likely to react positively to these acquisition 
announcements. Conversely, instead of competing for control or monitoring the behaviour of 
the dominant shareholder, if MLS collude together and share whatever benefits they extract, 
these MLS do not play a corporate governance role. The presence of a second largest 
shareholder (or more) will not effectively protect the interests of minority shareholders. 
When they make acquisitions, market perceives that these acquisitions will not be 
value-enhancing as they may be ways for large shareholders to extract private benefits 
collectively at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, market will not react 
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positively, or may even react negatively to these acquisition announcements. In order to 
identify whether MLS play an effective corporate governance role, we test in the sample of 
firms with at least one large shareholder (i.e. Presence1 equals to 1) where the agency 
problems between the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders are most probable.
9
 
Existing empirical findings show MLS play an effective governance role in mitigating such 
agency problems (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008; 
2009; Mishra, 2011). Favouring these findings, we also expect the market to react positively 
to acquisition announcements made by the firms with at least two large shareholders in the 
ownership structure. Therefore, we state our hypothesis 1 as: 
H1: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns are 
positively associated with Presence2. 
Presence2345 is the total number of large shareholders beyond the largest one (up to 
four) in a firm. The analytical literature does not provide a conclusive argument of whether 
the market reacts positively or negatively to acquisition announcements made by the firms 
with the presence of many large shareholders. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest the 
efficiency in decision making decreases with the increase of the number of relevant 
shareholders. In firms with the presence of MLS, many different coalitions with sufficient 
power to control the firms can be formed. The winning coalition is usually the one with the 
least cash flow stake because it is more beneficial to extract private benefits when the cash 
flow stake is small. This winning coalition thus has a larger incentive to expropriate other 
shareholders. The tendency that the winning coalition obtains control with a very small cash 
flow stake increases with the increase of the number of MLS or when cash flow rights are 
distributed more unevenly. The small cash flow stake held by the winning coalition, in turn, 
increases the tendency that the winning coalition extracts benefits to be shared among 
coalition members at the cost of other shareholders instead of performing monitoring (Bloch 
and Hege, 2001). In this case, market will react negatively to acquisition announcements 
made by the firms with many large shareholders. However, the bargaining effects hypothesis 
                                                          
9
 The same logic applies to remaining ownership structure variables (MLS proxies). We will test the effect of 
all these proxies for the presence and the power of MLS in the firms with at least one large shareholder. 
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of Gomes and Novaes (1999) suggests that the presence of many large shareholders can 
protect the benefits of minority shareholders. With the presence of many large shareholders, 
the disagreements among large shareholders become more likely. This makes the approval of 
any proposals more difficult unless most large shareholders think the proposals are helpful in 
maximizing their wealth. Although it may result in some value-enhancing merger proposals 
being passed away, value-destroying merger proposals can easily be identified and vetoed. In 
addition, more large shareholders increase the likelihood that they “vote with their feet” 
(through aggressive trading for profits) when they suspect they are being expropriated 
(Edmans and Manso, 2011). In this case, market views the presence of many large 
shareholders as a defence for minority shareholders‟ benefits and reacts positively when these 
firms make acquisition announcements. Moreover, the existence of many blockholders helps 
shift the voting outcome more towards the interests of minority shareholders (Dhillon and 
Rossetto, 2009). Current empirical studies support the presence of many blockholders is 
beneficial and has larger impact on corporate policies and firm performance (Attig et al., 
2008; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Mishra, 2011). In relation to these findings, we also 
expect that the presence of many large shareholders can protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, we state hypothesis 2 as: 
H2: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns are 
positively associated with Presence2345. 
ii) Vote2, Vote2/1 Ratio, Vote2345, Vote2345/1 Ratio & High_Diff  
This set of variables identifies the absolute power of MLS and power of MLS in 
relation to the largest shareholder.  
Vote2 is the size of voting rights of the second largest shareholder. It measures the 
votes of the second largest shareholder as a percentage of total votes outstanding. The impact 
of Vote2 depends on the role that MLS play. If the second largest shareholder, indeed, 
performs an efficient monitoring role, we expect this to be positively related to the bidder 
announcement period abnormal returns as market values the voting rights of the second 
largest shareholder. The larger the voting rights, the more competitive the second largest 
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shareholder is. It will be easier for the second largest shareholder to successfully veto any 
proposals that potentially destroy shareholder values. Contrary is true if MLS collude to 
extract mutual private benefits. Existing empirical findings suggest MLS play a corporate 
governance role and their power has a positive impact on lowering cost of equity capital 
(Attig et al., 2008) and increasing corporate risk taking (Mishra, 2011). Thus, we anticipate 
that market reacts positively to acquisition announcements made by the firms with larger 
Vote2. Likewise, if MLS play a corporate governance role, we should also expect market to 
react positively to acquisition announcements made by firms with higher Vote2/1 Ratio as it 
measures the relative voting power of the second largest shareholder vs. the largest 
shareholder. The higher the value of Vote2/1 Ratio, the more comparable is the second largest 
shareholder to the largest shareholder. The power of the largest shareholder will be more 
restricted as the second largest shareholder will be in a better position to replace her/him to 
control the firm with the help of other shareholders. The larger power of the second largest 
shareholder facilitates her/him to monitor the largest shareholder more effectively. Therefore, 
firms with larger power of the second largest shareholder are more likely to be associated 
with better corporate governance. Therefore, we expect the following hypotheses to hold in 
relation to the power of the second largest shareholder: 
H3a: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns 
are positively associated with Vote2; 
H3b: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns 
are positively associated with Vote2/1 Ratio. 
Vote2345 is the sum of voting rights of all large shareholders other than the largest one. 
If the presence of many large shareholders beyond the largest shareholder indeed is effective 
in mitigating the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders, the higher voting rights of these large shareholders can help them better 
perform their monitoring role (Pergola and Verreault, 2009), which in turn, better protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. Otherwise, higher voting power of these blockholders will 
not help protect the interests of minority shareholders. Current empirical findings suggest the 
voting power of the blockholders is beneficial for them to perform the corporate governance 
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role (Attig et al., 2008; 2009; Mishra, 2011). Thus, we expect Vote2345 to be positively 
related to the bidder announcement period abnormal returns and market assigns a positive 
value to the power of these blockholders. Similarly, we should expect Vote2345/1 Ratio, 
which measures the voting power of other large shareholders relative to that of the largest 
shareholder, to be positively related to the bidder announcement period abnormal returns as 
well. When other large shareholders have comparable or higher voting rights relative to the 
largest shareholder, coalitions with sufficient voting rights can be formed more easily. If the 
dominant shareholder does not make acquisitions that are of the best interests of majority 
shareholders, other large shareholders can easily gather their votes and control the firm 
instead. This helps ensure other large shareholders to perform the corporate governance role 
more smoothly. Therefore, we state the following hypotheses in relation to the power of 
blockholders: 
H4a: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns 
are positively associated with Vote2345; 
H4b: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns 
are positively associated with Vote2345/1 Ratio. 
High_Diff is the sum of squares of the voting rights differences of the five largest 
shareholders. The value of High_Diff will be large if voting rights are substantially unevenly 
distributed among these large shareholders. For example, if the largest shareholder holds 
exceptionally large voting power than other large shareholders, it will be harder for other 
large shareholders to monitor and restrict the activity of the largest shareholder. In this case, 
the largest shareholder can make acquisition decisions that benefit her/him without fearing 
other shareholders to have enough voting power to control. Hence, other shareholders cannot 
perform an effective governance role as they are not strong enough (in terms of voting power) 
to compete with the largest shareholder. Large dispersion of voting power of large 
shareholders thus indicates lower contestability of other large shareholders with the 
controlling shareholder, which leads to higher tendency of expropriation by the controlling 
shareholder. We expect market to react negatively to acquisition announcements made by 
firms with large High_Diff. Therefore, we state hypothesis 5 as:  
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H5: In firms featuring Presence1, bidder announcement period abnormal returns are 
negatively associated with High_Diff. 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Sample Construction 
To study the impact of ownership structure with MLS on bidder returns, we first 
extract our acquisition sample from the Securities Data Company‟s SDC Platinum - Global 
Merger and Acquisition database, where detailed information such as announcement date, 
bidder information, target information, deal characteristics are available for the mergers and 
acquisitions around the world. We then hand match the acquisition sample with the 
ownership data compiled from a sample of firms from 9 East Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) used 
by Claessens et al. (2000) and 13 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom) used by Faccio and Lang (2002). The ownership data provides information about 
the voting rights and shareholder type of up to the fifth largest shareholders computed in 
1996 for East Asia and between 1996 and 1999 for Western Europe. Third, we extract the 
bidder‟s total return index from the Datastream database for firms in the matched sample 
using Datastream code obtained from SDC’s Global Merger and Acquisition database. From 
the same database, we also extract Datastream country market return index for each country 
of the bidders, which we use to estimate bidder abnormal returns. Both the bidder stock and 
the country market index returns are measured in U.S. dollar. Fourth, we estimate the 
announcement period abnormal returns (CAR2) for a five-day (-2, +2) event window (two 
days before and after the event day) for the bidders in this sample using standard event study 
methodology following Brown and Warner (1985) and Masulis et al. (2007) with a 200-day 
(-220, -21) estimation window.
10
 Finally, we extract annual financial data from the 
Worldscope in order to calculate some of our control variables (Firm Size, Tobin’s Q, 
Leverage, Free Cash Flow). We merge our hand matched acquisition sample with the 
                                                          
10
 For both windows (event window and estimation window), day 0 is the acquisition announcement date.  
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Worldscope data by Datastream code, country and announcement year and obtain our final 
sample of 782 acquisition announcements made by 539 firms over the period of 1996 to 2000 
that meet the following criteria:
11
 
a. The acquisition is completed. 
b. The form of deal is either merger or acquisition as identified by letter “M” and “A” 
in SDC Platinum. 
c. The acquirer is seeking to own 100% of the target‟s shares after the transaction. 
d. The acquirer nation cannot be unknown. 
e. Information about deal value must be available. 
f. The type of acquisitions cannot be one of the following: exchange offers, 
repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
privatization, self-tenders, recapitalizations and spinoffs. 
g. The acquiring firm must be covered in either Claessens et al. (2000) or Faccio et al. 
(2002). 
h. The total return index of the acquiring firm must be available in the Datastream 
database. 
i. At least 100 observations with non-missing value for total return in the estimation 
period must be available to estimate market model parameters that we use in 
generating bidder CAR2. 
j. The data used in calculating some of our control variables for the acquiring firm 
must be available for the fiscal year ending before the acquisition announcement 
date from the Worldscope Database. 
k. Firms must be from countries that have both types of ownership structure: single 
large shareholder (SLS) and multiple large shareholders (MLS).
12
 
                                                          
11
 We choose 1996 as the threshold of our study period because the ownership structure data are systematically 
recorded since 1996 and SDC’s Global Merger and Acquisition data on acquisitions outside U.S. become more 
reliable as of that year. We choose a study period from 1996 to 2000 in order to be consistent with the 
ownership data, which helps avoid potential survivorship bias.  
12
 Our sample has 19 countries in total that meet the sample construction criteria from (a) to (j). However, 
among these 19 countries, Belgium and Korea only have firms with SLS while Austria and Thailand only have 
firms with MLS. If we include these countries, we may introduce large variations and bias to our results. Thus, 
we exclude them for our main analysis. 
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4.2 Variable Specifications 
     A brief description of our key variables is included in the Appendix A.1.  
4.2.1 Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
     We estimate our dependent variable, the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of the acquisition, using standard event study methodology. We obtain the 
announcement date from SDC’s Global Merger and Acquisition database. According to the 
single factor market model of Brown and Warner (1985), the abnormal return for a firm on a 
given trading day is its market-model adjusted return on that day and is calculated as: 
ARi,t = Ri,t – âi – ûi. Rm,t           (1) 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, Ri,t is the return for firm i on day t, Rm,t is 
the proxy for the return on the market portfolio (we use Datastream country market total 
return index for each country from Datastream as our market return proxy in this case), and 
âi and ûi are market model parameters from the following equation (2):  
Ri,t = âi + ûi Rm,t + êi,t            (2) 
     The equation (2) uses a 200-day estimation period including days -220 to -21 where 
day 0 is the acquisition announcement date and day -1 is the trading day before the 
announcement date. We compute the cumulative abnormal returns for the five-day (CAR2) 
event window (-2, +2) as follows:
13
 
        CARi (-2,+2) = ∑   
  
    i,t                               (3) 
     While testing the null hypothesis that the CAR2 is equal to zero, we estimate the test 
statistic proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) instead of the regular t-test: 
               t = 
∑    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
  
    
√∑  ̂    ̅̅ ̅̅  
  
     
                                        (4)
 
                                                          
13
 We use a multi-day event window in order to capture the possible information leakages that may occur before 
the announcement date as well as the market reaction lags after the announcement date. We believe an event 
window covers two days before and after the announcement date should be able to capture substantial market 
reactions related to the announcement. Other event windows are also tested for robustness and are included in 
the robustness tests section.  
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    ̅̅ ̅̅̅  is the mean abnormal returns of all the firms on day t and  ̂
    ̅̅ ̅̅    is the variance of 
the mean abnormal returns of all the firms calculated in the 200-day estimation period.  
Table 1A presents summary statistics of the bidder announcement period abnormal 
returns (CAR2) of our sample acquisition announcements by country. 
[Insert Table 1A] 
     The average five-day bidder announcement period abnormal returns (CAR2) for the 
whole sample is -1.14%. This indicates merger and acquisition transactions, on average, are 
value-decreasing for the bidder‟s shareholders in our sample. The range of the mean bidder 
CAR2 expands from -5.98% in Sweden to 4.85% in Germany. Notice that 68.67% of the 
acquisition announcements in our sample are made by firms from United Kingdom (U.K.). 
This result is actually not surprising as U.K. always represents a substantial amount of 
observations in many studies related to ownership structure in the international context, such 
as Faccio et al. (2006) and Laeven and Levine (2008). U.K. also has a large number of public 
firms represented in our ownership data obtained from Faccio and Lang (2002). We will 
address this issue in a separate section (section 6.1). On the other hand, the acquisitions are 
more uniformly distributed over time, as indicated in Table 1B. It presents summary statistics 
of the bidder announcement period abnormal returns (CAR2) of our sample acquisitions by 
year. 
[Insert Table 1B] 
It is likely that due to the influence of Asian financial crisis, the number of acquisitions 
in our sample drops substantially in 1997. Yet, it rebound in 1998 and reaches its peak in 
1999. Regardless of the impact of Asian financial crisis, Masulis et al. (2007) document the 
similar pattern with their domestic sample from United States. The mean bidder CAR2 for 
each year is negative, except for year 2000. The standard deviation of mean bidder CAR2 is 
larger for year 2000 than other years because the most positive and negative bidder CAR2s 
are concentrated in this year.  
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4.2.2 Ownership Structure  
Our explanatory variables are the proxies for the presence and the power of the MLS in 
the bidder‟s ownership structure. We develop two main sets of proxies representing the 
number of large shareholders and the power of these large shareholders, respectively. 
Presence1, Presence2 and Presence2345 are proxies that capture the pattern of ownership 
structure while Vote2, Vote2/1 Ratio, Vote2345, Vote2345/1 Ratio and High_Diff capture the 
voting power in relation to these large shareholders. The main task of this thesis is to 
investigate the relationship between these MLS proxies and the bidder announcement period 
abnormal returns in order to reveal whether MLS play an effective corporate governance role 
in alleviating the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders.  
4.2.3 Control Variables 
     We consider two main categories of control variables suggested by previous studies 
that are related to bidder announcement period abnormal returns: bidder characteristics and 
deal characteristics.  
     The characteristics of the bidder that we control for are Firm Size, Tobin’s Q, Leverage, 
Free Cash Flow and Price Runup. We use log of market capitalization of the bidder as the 
proxy for the bidder‟s size following Wang and Xie (2009). Existing empirical studies show 
that the size of the bidder is negatively related to the bidder CAR2 (Moeller et al., 2004; 
Masulis et al., 2007; Wang and Xie, 2009). This is in line with the managerial hubris 
hypothesis that larger bidders, on average, pay higher premiums and get negative dollar 
synergies from the acquisitions (Roll, 1986). Following this, we expect the bidder CAR2 to be 
negatively associated with the bidder size. We calculate the bidder‟s Tobin’s Q as the ratio of 
market value of assets over book value of assets of the bidder. It can be proxy for managerial 
ability (Lang et al., 1989), investment opportunities of the firm (Servaes, 1991) and firm‟s 
growth opportunities (Hail and Leuz, 2006). There is no conclusive evidence for the sign of 
Tobin’s Q from prior literature. In domestic acquisition studies (U.S. studies), Lang et al. 
(1989; 1991) and Servaes (1991) record a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and bidder 
CAR2 while Moeller et al. (2004) and Bhagat et al. (2005) document a negative relationship. 
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Both Masulis et al. (2007) and Wang and Xie (2009) show no significant relationship. Faccio 
et al. (2006) find no significant relationship in the full sample based on the international 
context. Therefore, we make no predication regarding the sign of Tobin’s Q. Leverage is the 
book value of debts over the market value of total assets. A high leverage level can help 
reduce future free cash flow that is disposal at corporate insiders‟ discretion (Masulis et al., 
2007). Higher leverage and regular commitment to debt repayment suggest that the firm is 
left with less cash flow that can be diverted to corporate insiders‟ personal benefits. Moreover, 
failure to repay debt on time will result in potential bankruptcy and liquidation of the firm. In 
order to avoid this from happening and remain in control of the firm, managers or the 
controlling shareholder has the incentive to make acquisitions that can help improve firm 
performance when leverage is high (Masulis et al., 2007). On the other hand, higher debt 
level may prevent firms from making value-enhancing acquisitions that are not affordable 
(Stulz, 1990). It may also give a signal to investors that the firm is experiencing operating 
difficulty. Thus, either sign of the coefficient of Leverage is possible. Maloney et al. (1993) 
record bidders with higher leverage have higher bidder CAR2 while Moeller et al. (2004) and 
Masulis et al. (2007) find insignificant relationship between leverage and bidder CAR2. With 
regards to Free Cash Flow, when firms have abundant cash flow, corporate insiders tend to 
extract private benefits from it instead of giving it back to investors (Jensen, 1986). They may 
make use of it to acquire value-destroying targets that may benefit themselves. They may also 
divert it to themselves through perquisite consumption. In this case, a high level of free cash 
flow will generate a negative market reaction. Large free cash flows, on the other hand, may 
reflect the high quality of managers, which lead to better recent firm performance (Masulis et 
al., 2007). Yet, both Moeller et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007) do not document any 
significant relationship between free cash flow and bidder CAR2. Hence, we do not have a 
conclusive prediction regarding the sign of Free Cash Flow. All variables of bidder 
characteristics are calculated using the annual fiscal year end data before the acquisition 
announcement year obtained from Worldscope according to the definitions in Appendix A.1. 
Using prior year data ensures characteristics of the bidder will not be affected by the 
acquisition announcement. In addition, Masulis et al. (2007) argue firm with poor corporate 
governance, in terms of having more ATPs, experience worse prior stock return performance. 
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In order to control for the impact of other corporate governance mechanism and isolate the 
impact of ownership structure from that of prior stock performance, we also control for Price 
Runup, which is the sum of the bidder returns over the 200-day estimation period from event 
day -220 to event day -21.  
     The characteristics of deals that we control for are the relative deal size, ownership 
status of the target, method of payment and whether the deals are cross-border deals, 
diversifying deals or deals from the high-tech industry. We use Deal Value to ACQ Value as 
a proxy for relative deal size. It measures the deal value relative to the market value of equity 
of the bidder. Existing empirical findings extensively support a positive impact of large 
acquisitions on bidder CAR2 (Asquith et al., 1983; Moeller et al., 2004). Some other studies, 
yet, do not find any significant relationship between the two (Masulis et al., 2007; Kuipers et 
al., 2009). With regards to the ownership status of the target, past studies examining domestic 
mergers for U.S. firms show bidders experience significantly positive CAR2 while buying 
private or subsidiary targets (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2003; Capron and Shen, 2007). 
Using evidence from 17 Western European countries, Faccio et al. (2006) document the 
consistent result, suggesting that shareholders from the bidder are better off when the target 
firm is not traded on an exchange. The rationale behind this is bidders usually get a better 
price while buying private targets as non-public targets are less liquid (Fuller et al., 2002). 
While acquiring public targets, the transaction price may increase in order to satisfy the 
interests of a large group of shareholders (Choi and Russell, 2004). Market thus reacts 
positively to acquisitions of private targets since bidders benefit from liquidity discounts. In 
our sample, we create three indicator variables to represent public, private and subsidiary 
targets, respectively. For the impact of the method of payment on bidder CAR2, we identify 
Stock deals with a value of “1” if the deal is paid either partially or purely by stock and “0”, 
otherwise. According to pecking order theory, equity financing is the least ideal financing 
method as it sends a negative signal to the market that the firm‟s stock is overvalued, which 
drives down the stock price of the bidder (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, market is likely to 
react negatively if the acquisition is paid by stock only, especially when managerial 
ownership is low (Amihud et al., 1990). However, Fuller et al. (2002) find acquirer returns 
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are significantly positive while acquiring private or subsidiary targets regardless of the 
method of payment. Purchase of the private target with stock may lead to the creation of new 
blockholders. The bidder‟s shareholders benefit from the increased monitoring of the firm‟s 
activities from these newly created blockholders. Thus, market may react positively even 
when the acquisition is paid with stock. In order to fully capture the effects of the ownership 
status of the target and the method of payment, we interact the three indicator variables 
(Public, Private and Subsidiary) with Stock. With the benefits of globalization, the number of 
mergers involving firms from different countries is also growing (Gugler et al., 2004; Moeller 
and Schlingemann, 2005). These cross-border mergers occur to seek for comparative 
advantages and explore more business opportunities (Neary, 2007; Aybar and Ficici, 2009). 
Cross-border mergers create values when the bidder is from a country that has better external 
governance in terms of better shareholder protection (Bris et al., 2008; Kuipers et al., 2009). 
However, Gugler et al. (2004) show cross-border mergers actually generate negative 
post-merger efficiency. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) also record lower acquirer returns 
with cross-border mergers, suggesting potential benefits from cross-border expansions are 
offset by various costs associated with these expansions. For instance, cross-borders mergers 
may encounter costs in dealing with cultural differences (Erel et al., 2011) and associated 
agency problems (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). It may be difficult to smoothly integrate 
two firms with different cultures, legal systems or languages and thus results in no synergistic 
gain for the bidder through the acquisitions. On the other hand, past evidence also show 
bidders‟ shareholder value is higher when bidders acquire cross-border targets than domestic 
targets (Chang et al., 2009). Thus, we do not have a conclusive prediction about the effect of 
Cross-border on bidder CAR2. When the bidder and the target do not share the same 
Fama-French industry, they are classified as diversifying acquisitions. Previous studies report 
mixed results for the relation between Diversifying and bidder CAR2. On one hand, 
diversifying acquisitions may result from the pursuit of potential self-interest by the corporate 
insiders. In order to avoid bankruptcy and remain in the control position as long as possible, 
corporate insiders tend to make acquisitions that may reduce the risk of the firm (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), especially when they do not hold a diversified 
portfolio of firms (Paligorova 2010; Faccio et al., 2010). Acquiring firms from unrelated 
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industry reduce the volatility of expected earnings and the possibility of financial distress in 
the future, although these acquisitions may not contribute to increasing shareholder values. 
Morck et al. (1990) show bidders of public firms have lower CAR2 when they acquirer 
diversifying targets. On the other hand, Campa and Kedia (2002) show diversification may be 
an outcome of self-selection determined by firm characteristics. These firms choose to 
diversify because the benefits from diversification outweigh the costs of doing so. In this case, 
diversification will actually lead to higher firm value. Other studies do not record any 
positive association between Diversifying and bidder CAR2 (Masulis et al., 2007; Wang and 
Xie, 2009). Hence, we do not reach any conclusion related to the sign of the coefficient of 
Diversifying. We assign value “1” to High_tech if both the bidder and the target are both high 
tech firms and “0”, otherwise. Combinations of high tech firms are believed to be 
value-destroying as it is difficult for them to integrate smoothly due to the compatibility of 
specialized human capital and intellectual property (Masulis et al., 2007; Wang and Xie, 2009; 
Aybar and Ficici, 2009), especially when two high tech firms of comparable size try to 
integrate together. Hence, following Masulis et al. (2007), we also interact the High_tech 
indicator variable with the relative deal size. We expect a negative association between 
High_tech, the interaction term and the bidder CAR2. The control variables for these deal 
characteristics are mainly constructed using data from our original acquisition sample that is 
extracted from the SDC’s Global Merger and Acquisition database. 
4.2.4 Industry Characteristics 
     We use Industry M&A, Competitiveness and Uniqueness to control for industry 
characteristics of the targets and the bidders. Moeller et al. (2004) argue bidder abnormal 
returns are negatively related to the competition for the target. If the competition for getting 
the target is fierce, the target can be sold very quickly without any substantial discounts. 
Since the successful bidder does not benefit from considerable discounts, its announcement 
period abnormal returns tend to be lower than its counterpart who buys a target without much 
competition. One way to examine the competition for the target is to investigate the liquidity 
of the market that the target is in. If the target can be sold very fast, the market for the target 
is said to be very liquid. Schlingemann et al. (2002) show different industries have very 
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different level of liquidity. Therefore, we construct Industry M&A, which measures the total 
value of acquisition for each prior year Fama-French industry scaled by the total book value 
of asset of all the firms in the corresponding industry for the same year as a proxy for the 
competition of the target‟s industry following Masulis et al. (2007). Larger number, 
indicating stronger competition of the target‟s industry, should lead to lower bidder abnormal 
returns.
14
 Leibenstein (1966) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue product market 
competition can effectively discipline the behaviour of the managers. It is harder for a firm to 
survive in an industry that is highly competitive. This requires corporate insiders to be more 
cautious about their decisions. Any unremarkable mistakes or sub-optimal decisions may 
threaten the survival of the firm. That means managers can lose their jobs and the controlling 
shareholder will not be able to control the firm any more if the firm fails. These corporate 
insiders thus have higher costs in making value-destroying decisions. When comes to making 
acquisition choice, they tend to make better acquisitions instead. Hence, product market 
competition can act as a governance mechanism to limit the inefficient behaviour of 
managers and the controlling shareholder. We use Competitiveness and Uniqueness to 
measure the product market competition of the bidder‟s industry following Masulis et al. 
(2007). Competitiveness is equal to “1” if the Herfindahl index of the bidder‟s industry is in 
the bottom quartile of all 48 Fama-French industries. The lower the value of the Herfindahl 
index, the more competitive the bidder‟s industry is. Thus, we should expect a positive 
relationship between Competitiveness and bidder CAR2. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue 
firms are likely to spend more on advertizing and selling their products if they sell relative 
unique or specialized products. Hence, selling expense scaled by sales can be used as a proxy 
for product uniqueness. Following Masulis et al. (2007), Uniqueness is equal to “1” if the 
selling expense to sales ratio of the bidder‟s industry is in the top quartile of all 48 
Fama-French industries.
15
 High selling expenses may create barrier-to-entry (Williamson, 
1963). Firms operating in industries with such entry barriers thus face less threat of new 
                                                          
14
 Following Masulis et al. (2007), we use prior year data in order to avoid any potential look-ahead bias. Our 
main results remain the same if we use current year data following Moeller et al. (2004).  
15 Due to data availability for certain countries, we use industry Competitiveness and Uniqueness created based 
on U.S.data as proxies for the competitiveness and uniqueness of the corresponding industry for our sample. We 
presume that the industry characteristics are less likely to vary substantially around the world. 
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competitors. In other words, the industry is less competitive if firms within the same industry 
sell more unique (less similar) products and mistakes are thus less critical (Gillan et al., 2003). 
Therefore, we expect Uniqueness to have a negative impact on bidder CAR2. 
4.2.5 Country Legal Institutions 
     As early as 1970‟s, Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify the importance of legal 
system in shaping market activities. La Porta et al. (2000) argue legal system can protect 
shareholders and help mitigate agency problems. This investor protection as ensured by the 
legal system has significant valuation effect and poor investor protection is usually 
penalized by lower firm value (La Porta et al., 2002), higher cost of equity capital (Hail and 
Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; Chen et al., 2009) and higher control premium 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2004). An improvement in investor protection can thus be accompanied 
with positive valuations. One way to realize this improvement is through acquisitions by 
firms from a country that has stronger investor protection. Bris et al. (2008) document an 
increased industry Tobin‟s Q when firms are acquired by bidders from countries with better 
shareholder protection and accounting standards and Kuipers et al. (2009) show bidder 
returns are positively related to the degree of shareholder protection and legal environment 
of the bidder. As a cross-country study, we have firms operating in countries with different 
juridical systems and corporate governance environments. This allows us to examine the 
effects of the variation in external governance environments. As a result, we employ five 
different proxies to capture the protection levels that investors have in each country. We use 
Disclosure Requirement, Investor Protection and Commom-Law Legal Origin extracted 
from La Porta et al. (1998) and Anti-self-dealing Index and Revised Anti-director Rights 
Index extracted from Djankov et al. (2008). Disclosure Requirement is the mean of the six 
important items (such as compensations, inside ownership) a firm is required to disclose. 
Investors can use this information and combine it with other information to evaluate 
whether they are potentially expropriated by the controlling shareholder or managers. 
Investor Protection is a more comprehensive proxy for the quality of a country‟s external 
governance as it is estimated as the principal component of disclosure, liability standards 
and anti-director rights. Common-Law Legal Origin is a dummy variable that identifies the 
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bidders from common-law legal origin countries. La Porta et al. (1998) show common-law 
countries protect investors the best. Hence, we expect market to react positively to 
acquisition announcements made by bidders that are from common-law legal origin 
countries. Anti-self-dealing Index is a more newly-constructed governance index that is 
based on legal rules applicable in May 2003. It takes into account both the ex-ante and 
ex-post private control of self-dealing by investors, covering approval of disinterested 
shareholders, ex-ante disclosure, ex-post disclosure and the ease of proving wrongdoing by 
corporate insiders. Djankov et al. (2008) show higher degree of anti-self-dealing can 
effectively reduce the private benefits control enjoyed by the controlling party. Since our 
focus is the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, 
self-dealing (or tunnelling) is the fundamental component of these problems. 
Anti-self-dealing Index, which measures the effectiveness of the law in regulating 
self-dealing problems, thus is a better proxy for shareholder protection related to corporate 
governance context and is preferable in cross-country empirical work (Djankov et al., 2008). 
Revised Anti-director Rights Index covers six areas of rights that shareholders can use to 
protect themselves from being expropriated. It provides a more precise and clearer measure 
than the original anti-director rights index of La Porta et al. (1998).
16
 A higher value for all 
these proxies for investor protection (except for Common-Law Legal Origin) indicates better 
external governance structure. Therefore, we expect them to be associated with higher 
bidder CAR2.  
Apart from the above control variables, we include both year dummies and country 
dummies to account for any potential year or country effects for most of our models.  
5. MODEL AND RESULTS 
5.1 Data Properties 
Table 2A presents the summary statistics of our key variables in the full sample.  
                                                          
16
 For instance, the original anti-director rights index does not distinguish enabling provisions from mandatory 
or default rules. The revised index only takes into account the rules that are explicitly mandate or default in 
protecting investors. It does not count the ones that firms have freedom to decide whether to comply or not. 
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[Insert Table 2A] 
Panel A outlines the properties of our ownership structure variables (proxies for the 
presence and the power of MLS). About 71% of the acquisition announcements in our sample 
are made by bidders featuring a dominant shareholder and about 31% are made by bidders 
that have at least two large shareholders.
17
 This suggests that the MLS structure exists in a 
significant percentage of firms in these two continents and this is consistent with prior studies 
(Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008; 2009; Mishra, 2011). 
The average voting power is 4.84% for the second largest shareholder and 6.64 for all large 
shareholders beyond the largest one. However, it is worth noting that these numbers include 
firms that do not have a second largest shareholder. Since around 69% of our sample do not 
feature MLS in ownership structure, it is not surprising that these two numbers are relatively 
small. Similarly, the power of the second largest shareholder and other large shareholders are 
small relative to the largest shareholder in our full sample. Panel B of Table 2A summarizes 
the characteristics of the bidders in our sample. The average firm size of the bidders as 
measured by natural log of market capitalization in million dollars (Log Market Cap) is 5.90. 
The mean market value of the bidders is roughly 2.48 times larger than their book value of 
assets as measured by Tobin’s Q. The bidders in our sample, on average, have a fair amount 
of free cash flow and enjoy a low level of leverage. The average value of the stock 
performance as measured by Price Runup is 9%. Panel C outlines the characteristics of the 
merger deals. The general deal value is about 41% of the market value of the bidder (Deal 
Value to ACQ Value). This indicates targets are roughly half as large as the bidders. About 
half of the acquisitions in our sample involve paying by stock and acquiring a target that is 
from a different industry than the bidder. 48% of the targets are private companies, 32% are 
public and 19% are subsidiary. Cross-border mergers make up a significant percentage, 
around 37%, of the merger transactions in our sample, which reinforce the findings that 
cross-border mergers have been growing worldwide (Gugler et al., 2004; Erel et al., 2011). 
There is relatively a small number of acquisitions in our sample involves the combination of 
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two high-tech firms. Panel D reports statistical properties of the three proxies for industry 
characteristics.  
Table 2B presents the pairwise correlations between variables.  
[Insert Table 2B] 
The different proxies for the presence and the power MLS, while exhibiting high 
correlation with each other, will enter into our regressions separately. Firm Size appears to be 
relatively more correlated with some control variables, such as cross-border deals, public 
target and private target. These correlations may result from the possibility that large bidders 
tend to indulge in cross-border mergers to seek for competitive advantages (Neary, 2007) and 
have a preference in acquiring specific targets, such as listed (non-private) firms (Faccio et al., 
2006). Besides, Tobin’s Q also tends to be relatively correlated with Free Cash Flow, 
High_tech and Industry M&A. While these correlations are not extreme, we will perform 
robustness tests to address any concerns associated with these variables. The correlations 
among the rest of the variables are not too large to raise concerns for multicollinearity.  
5.2 Univariate Tests 
     Table 3 presents results of our univariate tests of the bidder CAR2 by the type of the 
ownership structure of the firm. The tests divide our full sample into three sub-samples with 
the first one indicating acquisition announcements made by widely-held firms (i.e., firms 
with no large shareholder with at least 10% voting rights), second one indicating acquisition 
announcements made by SLS firms (i.e., only one large shareholder with at least 10% voting 
rights) and the last one indicating acquisition announcements made by firms featuring MLS 
structure (i.e. firms with least two large shareholders with at least 10% voting rights).  
[Insert Table 3] 
Acquisitions made by widely-held firms represent 29.16% of our full sample while 
acquisitions made by firms with at least one large shareholder (total number of acquisitions 
made by SLS firms and MLS firms) represent 70.84%. In particular, 44.04% of firms with at 
least one large shareholder have MLS structure in our sample. This percentage is comparable 
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to that of Attig et al. (2008), who report 44% MLS firms among the firms with dominant 
shareholders. On average, widely-held bidders have CAR2 of -0.92%, bidders with SLS have 
CAR2 of -1.99% and bidders with MLS have CAR2 of -0.27%. All these mean CAR2 are 
significantly different from zero.
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 However, MLS bidders experience much higher CAR2, 
on average, than the other two types of bidders.  
When we compare the bidder CAR2 of SLS bidders with that of widely-held bidders, 
we do not find significant different market reactions to their acquisition announcements. 
Although SLS bidders on average have CAR2 that are 1.07% lower than that of widely-held 
bidders, this mean difference is not significant. This indicates that with SLS bidders, the 
benefits of having a large shareholder are offset by the potential agency problems between 
the largest shareholder and dispersed small shareholders. Market may perceive there is 
simply a shift of agency problems from one type (managers vs. shareholders) to another (the 
dominant shareholder vs. dispersed small shareholders). We then compare the average CAR2 
between bidders with MLS and SLS. Bidders with MLS in their ownership structure generate 
substantially positive CAR2 compared to their counterparts with SLS structure. The mean 
difference in CAR2 is 1.72%, which is significant at 5% level. This suggests that market 
generally reacts more favourably to acquisition announcements made by the firms with MLS. 
One possible explanation to this favourable reaction is that the presence of MLS helps 
alleviate the agency problems between the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders, 
which are likely to be present in SLS firms. In other words, these MLS play an effective 
corporate governance role by monitoring the behaviour of the dominant shareholder or 
competing for corporate control (Attig et al., 2008; 2009; Mishra, 2011). When these firms 
make acquisition announcements, market perceives them as opportunities for the firms to 
grow and create value for shareholders. It puts a positive value on these acquisitions as 
evident from positive market reactions to their announcements. This preliminary evidence is 
consistent with our main prediction of the impact of MLS structure. However, the mere fact 
that MLS firms generally perform better (in terms of mean bidder CAR2) than SLS firms 
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 The computation of the test statistics of the mean bidder CAR2 is described in the data and methodology 
section (4.2.1) following Brown and Warner (1985). The mean CAR2 of widely-held and SLS bidders are 
significant at 1% while that of MLS bidders is significant at 5%. 
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does not allow us to draw a convincing conclusion that the better performance is the outcome 
of the MLS structure without controlling for other factors that may also influence the bidder 
CAR2. Therefore, we further test our predictions in a multivariate framework using ordinary 
least squares regressions. Since the agency problems of interest are most probable in firms 
with a dominant shareholder, we focus our tests on the sample of firms with at least one large 
shareholder in the ownership structure. 
5.3 Regression Model 
     In order to examine whether the MLS ownership structure has any impact on bidder 
returns and how this market reaction will be, we specify our basic model as follows:  
CAR2 = α + β*Ownership Structure + γ*Control Variables + δ*Fixed Effects + ε    (5) 
     where CAR2 = bidder announcement period abnormal returns; 
           Ownership structure = proxies for the presence and the power of MLS; 
           Control Variables = a set of variables related to bidder, deal, and industry 
characteristics;  
           Fixed Effects = dummy variables controlling for the fixed effects of years and 
countries; 
           ε = the error term. 
5.4 MLS Ownership Structure and Bidder CAR2 
We report our multivariate regression results from equation (5) in Table 4A and 4B.  
[Insert Table 4A] 
While our focus is the effect of large shareholder(s) beyond the dominant shareholder, 
we start by verifying our univariate results of the effect of a dominant shareholder in Model 
(1) of Table 4A. We regress bidder CAR2 on Presence1 and Presence2, controlling for year 
effects for the full sample. Our results show Presence1 has a negative significant loading 
while Presence2 has a positive significant loading vs. bidder CAR2. The significance of the 
coefficient of Presence1 disappears after we further control for country effects in Model (2). 
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The sign of the coefficient of Presence2 is still positive and significant. This suggests that the 
market, in general, reacts positively to acquisition announcements made by the firms with 
MLS. In order to further examine the association between the pattern of ownership structure 
and CAR2, we separately investigate the impact of Presence1 and Presence2 on CAR2. We 
start by regressing CAR2 on Presence1 for a sample of firms without a MLS structure and 
control for year effects in Model (3). The coefficient is negative, yet, not significant. This 
relationship continues to remain insignificant after controlling for country effects in Model (4) 
and including a set of control variables related to bidder characteristics, deal characteristics 
and industry characteristics in Model (5). In firms with a dominant shareholder, the dominant 
shareholder has the incentive to monitor the activity of the manager and thus help mitigate 
agency problems between shareholders and managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, 
such benefits may be offset by the costs of potential agency problems between the dominant 
shareholder and minority shareholders. The weak negative relationship between Presence1 
and bidder CAR2 suggests the decrease in agency problems between the manager and 
shareholders due to the presence of the dominant shareholder is about to be equal to the 
increase in the agency problems between the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders. 
Market perceives the presence of a dominant shareholder shifting the agency problems from 
the former to the latter. Hence, market does not have significant different reactions to 
acquisition announcements made by firms with single large shareholder compared to those by 
the firms with no large shareholder. In Model (6), we regress CAR2 on Presence2 for a 
sample of firms with at least one large shareholder in the ownership structure, controlling for 
year effects and country effects. Literature suggests that the agency problems between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholder are more probable in firms featuring 
Presence1 (Volpin, 2002). By limiting our sample to firms with at least one large shareholder, 
we are essentially comparing the CAR2 of SLS bidders and MLS bidders, leaving out 
widely-held firms.
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 The result shows the presence of a second largest shareholder is 
significantly positively associated with bidder CAR2. Since our interest is the agency 
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 Since there is no large shareholder in widely-held firms, our main focus---the agency problems between the 
dominant shareholder and other large shareholders do not exist in these firms. Therefore, we leave them out of 
our main focus.  
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problems in firms with a dominant shareholder, in Table 4B, we test the impact of MLS and 
their power on CAR2 with a full set of control variables for a sample of firms with at least 
one large shareholder and these constitute our baseline regressions.
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[Insert Table 4B] 
     In Model (1) of Table 4B, we regress bidder CAR2 on Presence2 and a full set of 
control variables. We find that Presence2 continues to load with a positive and significant 
sign, suggesting market, indeed, reacts positively to acquisition announcements made by the 
firms with the presence of MLS in the ownership structure, after taking into account the 
effect of other factors, such as firm size, bidder‟s Tobin‟s Q, bidder‟s free cash flow, leverage 
and price runup, target‟s ownership status and several other deal characteristics and industry 
characteristics on CAR2. One possible explanation of this finding is that MLS help reduce the 
agency problems in firms with a dominant shareholder (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and 
Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008; 2009; Mishra, 2011), which leads to a positive market 
reaction to merger announcements. They possibly perform the effective corporate governance 
role by efficiently monitoring the activities of the dominant shareholder and managers or 
competing with the dominant shareholder for corporate control (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). With the presence of a second largest shareholder, bidder 
CAR2 increase by approximately 1.89%. This increase is quite substantial considering the 
mean bidder CAR2 of our full sample is about -1.14%. In order to test whether the power of 
the second largest shareholder entitled by her/his voting rights has any impact on bidder 
CAR2, we regress bidder CAR2 on Vote2 and the full set of control variables in Model (2). 
The coefficient of Vote2 is positive and significant at 10% level. This suggests the power of 
the second largest shareholder, although the effect is not as strong as that of Presence2, also 
has a positive effect on bidder announcement returns. The second largest shareholder may 
effectively use the power embedded in her/his voting rights to protect the interests of 
herself/himself and minority shareholders. For instance, if s/he feels the dominant 
shareholder is making corporate decisions that will not create value for majority shareholders, 
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 The p-value of the F-statistic for all models are 0.0000, indicating all models are significant (not all variables 
are equal to zero). All models are assumed to be highly significant for the remaining paper, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
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s/he can vote against such decisions in cases where shareholder voting is required or by 
electing directors who would follow his/her directives. With one standard deviation (7.81) 
increase in the voting power of the second largest shareholder, bidder CAR2 increase by 
about 0.7% (=0.09%*7.81). Similarly, in Model (3), we test whether market also values the 
relative power of the second largest shareholder (Vote2/1 Ratio). Consistent with our 
expectation, the coefficient of Vote2/1 Ratio is also positive and significant. This suggests 
relative power of the second largest shareholder to the largest shareholder also has a positive 
valuation effect. Larger relative power facilitates the second largest shareholder to protect 
other shareholders as it will be easier for her/him to veto any value-destroying proposals from 
the largest shareholder. Market puts a similar value of the increase in the relative power of 
the second largest shareholder (Vtoe2/1 Ratio) to Vote2 as one standard deviation (0.34) 
increase in the power of the second largest shareholder in relation to the largest shareholder 
translates into about 0.69% (=2.03%*0.34) increase in bidder CAR2.  
     So far, we have seen the presence of a second largest shareholder as well as the 
associated attributes have positive impacts on bidder CAR2. Yet, what if there are many large 
shareholders? Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue when there are many large 
shareholders, the efficiency in decision making actually declines. Apart from this, the 
presence of many large shareholders allows the winning coalition to have very little cash flow 
rights, which motivates the winning coalition to extract private benefits instead of making 
decision that benefit all shareholders. This is especially true if the cash flow stake is more 
unevenly distributed (Bloch and Hege, 2001). The bargaining effects hypothesis of Gomes 
and Novaes (1999), however, suggests that the presence of many large shareholders may 
actually better protect the benefits of minority shareholders due to the increased 
disagreements among shareholders. These disagreements effectively create an environment 
rejecting any decisions that are not value-enhancing. The presence of many large 
shareholders also increases the chances that large shareholders mitigate expropriation through 
aggressive trading (Edmans and Manso, 2011). Such an aggressive trading will inject 
negative information to the market that may lead to a decrease in stock prices. In order to 
discourage other large shareholders from doing so, the dominant shareholder has incentives 
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to make better corporate decisions. Moreover, Dhillon and Rossetto (2009) argue that the size 
of equity stakes determines the risk/return preference of the shareholders. The larger the 
equity stakes, the lower the risk/return they prefer. The presence of many blockholders helps 
shift the voting outcome towards higher risk/return projects, which is more towards the 
interests of minority shareholders. We, thus, test for the impact of many large shareholders on 
bidder CAR2. In Model (4), we regress bidder CAR2 on the total number of large 
shareholders beyond the largest one (Presence2345) and a full set of control variables. The 
result shows the presence of many large shareholders is positively associated with bidder 
CAR2, which lends support to the bargaining effects hypothesis of Gomes and Novaes (1999), 
the trading mechanism hypothesis of Edmans and Manso (2011) and Dhillon and Rossetto 
(2009). With the presence of blockholders, bidder CAR2 will increase by approximately 
0.87%. In Model (5), we test the impact of the power of large shareholders beyond the largest 
shareholder (Vote2345) on bidder CAR2. As expected, Vote2345 has a positive impact on 
bidder CAR2. However, the coefficient is not significant. In Model (6), the relative power of 
these large shareholders, as indicated by Vote2345/1 Ratio, loads with a positive and 
significant coefficient. Bidder CAR2 increases by about 0.74%(=1.37%*0.54) with one 
standard deviation (0.54) increase in the power of all large shareholders beyond the largest 
one in relation to that of the largest shareholder. Similar to the argument with the relative 
power of the second largest shareholder, if the total power of other large shareholder are more 
comparable or greater than that of the largest shareholder, other large shareholders can better 
protect minority shareholder with a veto on any sub-optimal decisions. On the contrary, if the 
relative power of the largest shareholder is larger, it is harder for MLS to accumulate enough 
votes to compete against the largest shareholder. Particularly, if the voting rights are 
substantially unevenly distributed, it will be harder for good shareholders to gather enough 
votes to vote against decisions favoured by bad shareholder(s). This is why we expect a 
negative sign for High_diff in Model (7). However, although the sign of the coefficient of 
High_diff is consistent with our expectation, it is not significant.  
     Among the control variables of bidder characteristics, Free Cash Flow is negative and 
significant for all models, which lends support to the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen 
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(1986). The sign of Leverage is consistent with the finding of Wang and Xie (2009), although 
their result is not significant. Consistent with the finding of Masulis et al. (2007), we also 
have a negative and significant coefficient of Price Runup. In Models (4), (6) and (7), Tobin’s 
Q loads with a negative coefficient and is significant at 10% level. This reinforces the 
findings of Moeller et al. (2004) and Bhagat et al. (2005). Regarding the control variables for 
deal characteristics, the interaction term of public target and stock is positive and significant. 
The rationale behind this is that paying acquisitions by stock may create new blockholders or 
increase the power of existing blockholders (if they continue to buy more shares in cases 
where acquisitions are financed by issuing more stocks). Shareholders of the bidder may thus 
benefit from the active monitoring of the firm‟s activities by these blockholders. The finding 
of Uniqueness of the bidder‟s industry is consistent with that of Masulis et al. (2007) and 
Gillan et al. (2003). Firms operating in industries that are more unique require higher selling 
expenses, which create barrier-to-entry (Williamson, 1963). Market perceives these firms 
may have higher agency problems as they are less likely to fail due to less fierce competition 
from new entrants. For rest of the control variables, although insignificant, controlling for 
them help us to be more confidence with our findings instead of being concerned that the 
findings may be bias due to these factors.  
     To summarize, our findings in Table 4A and 4B reinforce the importance of MLS in 
mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, 
which are consistent with the findings of Maury and Pajuste (2005), Laeven and Levine 
(2008), Attig et al. (2008; 2009), Bharath et al. (2010) and Mishra (2011). They play an 
effective corporate governance role possibly by participating in the competition for corporate 
control or efficiently monitoring the activities of the management and controlling shareholder 
(Gomes and Novaes, 1999; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Noe, 2002; Bloch and Hege, 
2001; Edmans and Manso, 2011; Dhillon and Rossetto, 2009). Market puts a positive value to 
MLS ownership structures by reacting positively when these firms make acquisition 
announcements. In other words, it perceives these acquisitions are more likely to represent 
most shareholders‟ interests in maximizing firm value. In addition, market also gives a 
positive value to the voting power associated with the second largest shareholder. Similarly, 
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if the voting power of the second largest shareholder and other shareholders are more 
comparable with that of the largest shareholder, market recognize them as useful in protecting 
the interests of a majority number of shareholders.  
5.5 MLS Ownership Structure, Investor Protection and Bidder CAR2 
While examining merger and acquisition transactions on an international context, it is 
crucial to recognize that different countries may have different legal and institutional settings. 
This is also a key advantage of a cross-country study as it allows us to examine the effects of 
the variation in external governance environments. Differences in legal institutions may have 
an impact on market reactions to merger activities. For instance, domestic takeovers 
consistently record positive mean abnormal returns in Germany (Boehmer, 2000) while other 
countries do not have such a consistency. Besides, with the benefits of global market 
penetration, more and more cross-border acquisitions have been taking place. An important 
factor in shaping market reactions (investor perception) to all these acquisitions is the legal 
institutions of jurisdictions (external governance mechanism) in which firms operate. 
Existing literature suggests better legal institutions can provide protection to a firm‟s outside 
investors. The minority shareholders are less subject to expropriation in countries with better 
investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000). Current empirical studies lend great support to this 
argument as better investor protection is associated with higher firm valuation (La Porta et al., 
2002), lower cost of equity capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009). In 
addition, Kuipers et al. (2009) show both the bidder returns and the portfolio returns of the 
bidder and the target are positively related to the degree of shareholder rights of the bidder‟s 
country. In order to account for the degree of investor protection across countries, we 
separately include in our regressions five different proxies for investor protection, namely 
Disclosure Requirement, Investor Protection and Common-Law Legal Origin from La Porta 
et al. (1998) and Anti-self-dealing Index and Revised Anti-director Rights from Djankov et al. 
(2008). We replicate Model (1) of Table 4B by further including the proxies for country level 
investor protection. As these proxies largely pick up the differences among countries, we do 
not control for country effects in these regressions. We report the results from Model (1) to 
Model (5) in Table 5. 
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[Insert Table 5] 
In Table 5, the coefficient for Presence2 is consistently positive and highly significant 
across the five models. This suggests, after controlling for the quality of a country‟s legal 
institution that protect investors, the presence of MLS in the ownership structure continues to 
have a positive impact on bidder CAR2. Among the deal characteristics, apart from the 
significant ones in Table 4B, High-tech is also significant for all models in this analysis. The 
sign of the coefficient is consistent with that of Masulis et al. (2007), although their result is 
not significant. With regards to the country legal institutions, the sign of all proxies is 
consistent with the literature and our expectation. In particular, Disclosure Requirement and 
Investor Protection are positive and significant at 10% while Common-Law Legal Origin and 
Anti-self-dealing Index are positive and significant at 5%. These results support the existing 
investor protection literature that better investor protection is valuable as market reacts 
positively if acquisition announcements are made by the firms from the strong investor 
protection countries. Except for Common-Law Legal Origin, the stronger effect (in terms of 
significance level) of Anti-self-dealing Index than other proxies further confirms that this 
index is preferable to other investor protection proxies as it directly measures the central 
problem of corporate governance in most countries (Djankov et al., 2008). Market puts a 
larger positive value for bidders from a country that has rules that better protect investors in 
terms of corporate self-dealing problems. More importantly, the highly significant coefficient 
of our proxy for MLS suggests MLS are effective in reducing agency problems between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. This conclusion is not dependent on the 
effect of the quality of investor protection that is embedded in the country corporate 
governance. To summarize Table 5, our prediction that MLS play an effective corporate 
governance role in mitigating agency problems continues to hold after we control for the 
quality of external governance mechanism. Besides, our findings of country legal institutions 
suggest market values the degree of investor protection of the bidder‟s country.       
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6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We test the sensitivity of our results, using a series of robustness tests. Specifically, we 
examine the sensitivity of our outcomes regarding the impact of different regions, industry 
fixed effects, different control variable proxies, clustering effects, different event windows, 
alternative abnormal returns measures, investor protection of the target‟s country and 
potential endogeneity issues.  
6.1 Regional Analysis of MLS Ownership Structure and Bidder CAR2 
Recall from Table 1A, United Kingdom is disproportionately represented in our full 
sample. To mitigate the concern of such a disproportionate representation, we use country 
level controls or control for country fixed effects throughout our analyses in section 5 and 
rest of the section 6. In this sub-section, we aim to re-examine this issue in more details. 
Specifically, we start by replicating our baseline regression related to Presence2 for 
acquisition announcements made by firms from United Kingdom only in Model (1) of Table 
6A. We then add firms from Western Europe that have both types of ownership structures 
(SLS and MLS) in Model (2). After adding firms from Western Europe, we add firms from 
East Asian regions that have both type of ownership structure in Model (3). This is essentially 
our baseline model of Presenc2 – Model (1) in Table 4B. Finally, in Model (4), we add back 
firms from the four countries that have only one type of the ownership structures (either SLS 
or MLS), which are excluded from our main analyses based on the sample construction 
criteria.
21
 We report these results in Table 6A. 
[Insert Table 6A] 
The results in Tale 6A show the coefficient of Presence2 is significant and positive for 
all models. In other words, market reacts positively to acquisition announcements made by 
firms with MLS ownership structure for firms from United Kingdom. Such positive market 
reaction continues to hold when we further include other Western European and East Asian 
firms in the sample. Even when we increase the variation of the sample by adding back 
acquisition announcements made by firms from countries featuring bidders with only one 
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type of the ownership structures (SLS or MLS), the result is robust. These findings suggest 
although our results are heavily influenced by United Kingdom as it has the largest number of 
observations, they do remain robust when we add a large number of firms from other 
countries into the sample, which allows us to make a more general prediction on the value of 
MLS in mitigating agency problems. 
     To further examine the impact of ownership structure on bidder CAR2 between 
Western Europe and East Asia, we conduct univariate tests for these two regions and report 
our results in Table 6B. 
[Insert Table 6B] 
     SLS bidders from East Asia, on average, experience negative CAR2 of -3.89% while 
MLS bidders from the same region have a positive mean CAR2 of 1.43%. This represents a 
mean bidder CAR2 difference of 5.32% and this difference is significant at 10%. Although 
both SLS and MLS bidders from Western Europe have negative mean bidder CAR2, MLS 
bidders experience less negative average bidder CAR2 than SLS bidders. MLS bidders from 
Western Europe, on average, have bidder CAR2 that are 1.32% higher than SLS bidders from 
the same region and this difference is significant at 10% as well. The substantial bidder CAR2 
difference of the two types of bidders in East Asia suggests the role of MLS may be more 
effective in East Asia than Western Europe. The small number of observations from East 
Asia prevents us from conducting more thorough multivariate tests to confirm this result. 
However, the multivariate tests for Western European bidders (Model (2) in Table 6A) show 
our ownership structure proxy – Presence2 – loads with a positive and significant coefficient, 
suggesting MLS do play a corporate governance role in reducing agency problems between 
the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in general. 
6.2 Industry Fixed Effects 
     In all our analyses thus far, we include known industry controls, i.e. the liquidity of the 
target‟s industry (Industry M&A) and product market competition of the bidder‟s industry 
(Competitiveness and Uniqueness) following Masulis et al. (2007). In order to address any 
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potential unknown industry effects, we further control for industry fixed effects and replicate 
our baseline regressions. We report these results in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7] 
     Results in Table 7 show our findings remain robust when we further control for 
industry fixed effects.
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 The coefficients of our proxies for the presence and the power of 
MLS are positive and significant as in our main tests. In addition, the coefficient of voting 
power of all large shareholders beyond the largest one (Vote2345) also becomes significant at 
5% level. These findings suggest the presence of MLS, their voting power and relative power 
all have a positive impact on bidder CAR2.  
6.3 Different Control Variable Proxies 
     Recall from the pairwise correlation table (Table 2B), we notice our proxy for firm size 
as measured by log of market capitalization of the bidder has relatively higher correlations 
with three other control variables: 0.36 with Cross-border, -0.39 with Private Target and 
0.41 with Public Target. In order to mitigate the concern that these correlations may affect 
the outcomes of our regression models, we use two other proxies for firm size: the log of 
book assets and the log of net sales. We replicate our baseline model of Presence2 using 
these proxies and report the results in Models (1) and (2) of Table 8. Similarly, Tobin’s Q 
also has relatively higher correlations with Free Cash Flow (-0.52), High_tech (0.31) and 
Industry M&A (0.37). When we look into the data property of Tobin’s Q, we realize it has 
substantial outliers. In order to mitigate bias from these outliers, we winsorize Tobin’s Q at 
0.5% in both ends. We notice the original higher correlations with those three variables thus 
drop considerably. Model (3) reports the regression result with the winsorized Tobin’s Q. To 
further mitigate the concern of high correlations, we employ Market-to-book Value as a proxy 
for Tobin’s Q in Model (4). In model (5) and (6), we use two different proxies for Free Cash 
Flow: ROA and Cash & Cash Equivalent. These also help to reduce the correlation between 
the original Tobin’s Q and Free Cash Flow to a large extent. Recall from the summary 
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statistics of key variables in Table 2A, we also notice there may be outliers for the relative 
deal size (Deal Value to ACQ Value). Similar to Tobin’s Q, we winsorize this variable at 0.5% 
and change the interaction term of relative deal size and High_tech accordingly. We report 
this regression result in Model (7).  
[Insert Table 8] 
     The results show regardless which proxies for the above control variables we use, the 
significance of our main test variable – Presence2 - remain unaffected. The economic impact 
on bidder CAR2 for all these models ranges from 1.79% to 2.09%, which does not vary 
substantially across different models. The robust results suggest our findings are not 
significantly affected by the relatively high correlations between control variables or outliers. 
These results also help reinforce our main finding that MLS perform a corporate governance 
role and market reacts positively to acquisition announcements made by the firms with the 
presence of MLS in the ownership structure.  
6.4 Country, Industry and Bidder Clustering 
     For our main analyses, we control for any known (country legal institutions) in Table 5 
and unknown country fixed effects in Table 4A and 4B using country dummies. Apart from 
these, to address any concerns regarding the potential cross-sectional correlation within 
countries, we correct the standard errors of regression coefficients for country clustering. 
Likewise, we control for known industry effects (Industry M&A, Competitiveness and 
Uniqueness) in Table 4A, 4B and Table 5 and further control for unknown industry effects in 
Table 7. Empirical evidence show merger activities tend to cluster in specific industries 
(Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Kiymaz and Baker, 2008). Therefore, to account for any 
clustering in particular industries, we correct the standard errors of regression coefficients for 
industry clustering. Finally, we also correct the standard errors of regression coefficients for 
bidder clustering to account for potential cross-sectional correlation within bidders following 
Masulis et al. (2007) and Wang and Xie (2009). We report these results from Model (1) to 
Model (3) in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9] 
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     Although different control variables show up to have a significant impact on bidder 
CAR2 as standard errors of regression coefficients vary when we correct them for different 
types of clustering, the significance of our main test variable – Presence2 – remain strong. 
When we correct the standard errors of regression coefficients for industry clustering of 
bidders, the positive impact of the presence of MLS on bidder CAR2 becomes highly 
significant (at 1% level).  
6.5 Event Windows 
     So far, we use a 5-day event window (-2, +2) for all our analyses where date 0 is the 
acquisition announcement date. In order to address the concern that our results may be 
dependent on the choice of event window, we repeat Model (1) of Table 4B for different 
event windows. Specifically, we test event windows that cover a longer time period before 
and after the announcement, such as (-5, +5), (-4, +4) and (-3, +3). We also test an event 
window with shorter time period (-1, +1). Moreover, we test post announcement event 
windows covering two days (0, +2) and one day (0, +1) after the announcement, respectively. 
We report these results in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10] 
     From Table 10, we can see no matter which event window we choose, Presence2 
continuously to have a positive and significant effect on bidder CAR2 with some variation in 
the magnitude and significance level. These results confirm that our findings do not depend 
on specifically chosen event window.  
6.6 Investor Protection of the Target’s Country 
In our tests thus far, we control for the investor protection proxies for the bidder‟s 
country in Table 5 and country fixed effects in other tables. However, there may be concern 
that the degree of investor protection of the target‟s countries is an omitted variable from our 
regressions. Wang and Xie (2009) test whether there is any operating performance change of 
the combined company in a merger activity. Their result shows the shareholder rights 
difference has a positive and significant impact on the operating performance change of the 
combined company. This implies the improvement of governance mechanism may have 
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post-merger valuation effect and the governance transfer could be from either side. That is, it 
is possible that good bidders may acquire firms from a country that has strong degree of 
investor protection and market reacts positively to these acquisitions. Bris et al. (2008) show 
weak evidence that the industry Tobin‟s Q still increases if a bidder from a country with poor 
corporate governance acquires the target from a country with good corporate governance. In 
order to mitigate the concern that the choice of the target from a good investor protection 
country may have an impact on CAR2, we replicate our baseline regression model of 
Presence2 by including investor protection proxies for the target‟s country. We use the five 
country legal institutions proxies from Table 5 (Disclosure Requirement, Investor Protection, 
Common-Law Legal Origin, Anti-self-dealing Index and Revised Anti-director Rights Index) 
and report the results in Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11] 
      Although the proxies for the target‟s country legal institutions are not significant, our 
proxy for MLS structure, Presence2, continues to load with a positive and significant 
coefficient after controlling for the quality of investor protection of the target‟s country. This 
reinforces our conclusion that MLS reduce the agency problems between the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders and this conclusion is not affected by the potential 
effect of the degree of investor protection in the target‟s country.23  
6.7 Alternative Measures of Abnormal Returns 
     Our dependent variable, CAR2, is 5-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of the acquisition. The daily abnormal returns are estimated using market 
model as described in section 4.2.1, which is also given by equation (1) below:  
          ARi,t = Ri,t – âi – ûi Rm,t                       (1) 
where market-model parameters âi and ûi are estimated over a 200-day estimation period 
(-220, -21). We choose market-model adjusted return as it is both well-specified and 
                                                          
23
 Information of Disclosure Requirement, Investor Protection and Common-Law Legal Origin is missing for 
five countries and information of Anti-self-dealing Index and Revised Anti-director Rights Index is missing for 
two countries. 
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relatively powerful under a variety of conditions according to Brown and Warner (1985). To 
test the sensitivity of our dependent variable, in this section, we use alternative measures of 
abnormal returns. In particular, we use: i) mean adjusted returns estimated as the difference 
between daily stock returns and the average stock returns over the estimation period (-220, 
-21); ii) market adjusted returns estimated as daily stock returns less daily market returns, 
where market returns is the Datastream country market total return index for each country; iii) 
two-factor model where the two indices used are the Datastream country market total return 
index for each country and the Datastream global market total return index (See Appendix 
A.2. for details of these models). We report the results for these different abnormal returns 
measures from Model (1) to (3) in Table 12. Again, our proxy for MLS remains positive and 
significant for all these three measures of bidder abnormal returns. That is, our findings are 
not affected by the choice of abnormal returns measures. In addition, we use an estimation 
period that covers 220 days to 20 days before the announcement date (-220, -20). To mitigate 
the concern that our results may be the outcome of the choice of this estimation window, we 
test our predictions using the cumulative abnormal returns that based on the estimation period 
used in Masulis et al. (2007), which covers 210 days to 11 days prior to the announcement 
date (-210, -11). We report the results of this test in Model (4) of Table 12. The result while 
using (-210, -11) estimation period is practically similar to that in our baseline test, 
suggesting our finding regarding the role of MLS is robust. To conclude, the choice of 
different abnormal returns measures or estimation window does not alter our conclusion that 
MLS play an effective corporate governance role in mitigating the agency problems between 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.  
[Insert Table 12] 
6.8 Endogeneity Concerns 
    
 Although our focus of this section is the endogeneity concern of ownership structure, we 
start by addressing the endogeneity concern of our control variables as discussed in Masulis 
et al. (2007) and Wang and Xie (2009). Some of our control variables for bidder and deal 
characteristics may be endogenously determined. Variables that are potentially endogenous 
are Tobin’s Q and Price Runup, which can be proxies for firm performance (Masulis et al., 
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2007; Wang and Xie, 2009); Leverage, which may be determined by investment 
opportunities and availability of investment projects; Free Cash Flow, which is highly 
correlated with firm operating performance; Cross-border, which may be influenced by the 
size of the bidder (Neary, 2007), Diversifying, which may be affected by some corporate 
governance mechanisms (Masulis et al., 2007) and method of payment, which is related to 
the financial status and ownership structure of the bidder (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). We 
re-estimate our baseline regressions by using control variables that are most likely free of 
endogeneity. That is, we substitute the industry average for Tobin’s Q, Leverage and Free 
Cash Flow and exclude variables related to Price Runup, Cross-border, Diversifying and 
method of payment (we keep two variables for the status of target: Public Target and Private 
Target). Using industry average helps reduce that possibility that these variables are 
determined by the choice or status of a particular firm. We report these results in Table 13A 
and we find our previous findings are robust.  
[Insert Table 13A] 
Turing to the endogeneity concern of ownership structure, prior literature suggests that 
a firm‟s ownership structure may be endogenously determined by the contracting 
environment it is operating in (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999). For 
instance, ownership structure with a large shareholder (high concentration of ownership) is 
more likely associated with poor investor protection environments (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) also argue spurious relationship or reverse causality may be formed 
due to the unobservable factors in the contracting environment. That is, the MLS ownership 
structure of the bidder may be endogenously determined by some unobservable variables and 
these unobservable variables may have positive impacts on bidder CAR2. In addition, 
bidder‟s ownership structure may change if the acquisition is paid by stock. In particular, 
when the acquisition is financed by issuing new stocks, it may create new blockholder(s) or 
the equity stake of the existing shareholders may alter. These may lead to a change of 
ownership structure soon after the acquisition, which we are unable to control for. 
While the lack of time series data on ownership structures prevents us from conducting 
more dynamic tests such as panel data fixed effects to better address the potential 
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endogeneity issues, we include year dummies and country dummies in most of our models to 
control for any year or country fixed effects. We also perform robustness tests by including 
industry fixed effects in Table 7 and investor protection proxies for the target‟s country in 
Table 11. We believe these tests address the possible omitted variable problem to a large 
extent. In addition, wealthy investors may self-select a good quality firm and stay as passive 
blockholders. Managers of the good quality firm make corporate decisions that are of the best 
interest of majority shareholders. Evidence can be seen if the firm made good mergers and 
acquisitions or investment decisions in the past. This attracts wealthy individuals and 
institutions to buy in shares. These investors believe managers will continue making good 
corporate decisions and thus may not monitor managers‟ activities or participate in corporate 
decisions actively.
24
 Hence, any market reactions towards the acquisition announcements 
may have nothing to do with the existence of these blockholders. In that case, we may falsely 
attribute market reactions to the presence of MLS. To address such reverse causality 
problems, we use instrumental variable (IV) approach following Laeven and Levine (2009) 
and Paligorova (2010). Under the IV approach, it is crucial to identify instruments that are 
exogenous. To qualify for exogenous instruments, variables have to be highly correlated with 
our MLS proxies but not bidder CAR2. We use the industry average value of the proxies for 
the presence and the power of MLS as instruments for our firm level MLS proxies. While it is 
possible that wealthy investors self-select one good quality firm, it is unlikely that all firms in 
the whole industry are good quality firms and wealthy investors just buy in shares and stay 
passive. In unreported results, we find our instruments are indeed highly correlated with our 
MLS proxies but not bidder CAR2. We use 2SLS (two-stage least squares) regressions for 
this IV approach and test for endogeneity in the first stage. If the variables are not 
endogenous, OLS regressions provide more efficient estimators. Thus, we should perform our 
analysis using OLS regressions. Otherwise, 2SLS regressions should be used. We report the 
specifications of our baseline regressions using the IV approach in Table 13B.  
[Insert Table 13B] 
                                                          
24
 Our use of event study methodology largely mitigates the possibility of this reverse causality, as such 
decisions would largely be made prior to merger events.  
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     We use the Wu-Hausman test to test for endogeneity of our variables. The p-values of 
the Wu-Hausman test of all models are larger than 5%, suggesting that we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that variables are exogenous. This means our original proxies for the presence 
and the power of MLS are not endogenous. In other words, serious endogeneity problems 
may not be a concern for all our baseline models. OLS regressions are more appropriate than 
2SLS regressions in our case. 
6.9 Other Unreported Robustness Tests  
     Apart from the above robustness tests, we also perform following robustness tests that 
are not reported here for brevity:
 25
 
First, we replicate our baseline regressions by removing all known industry effects and 
control for unknown industry fixed effects only. Our proxies for the presence and the power 
of MLS remain positive and significant.  
Second, if there is insider trading activity, market may start to react prior to the 
announcement of the acquisition. We test event windows that cover a longer time period prior 
to the announcement to capture potential insider trading activities in section 6.5. To better 
address this issue, we use two different country-level proxies: Insider Ownership and Insider 
Prevalence Index (indicates the prevalence of insider trading) from La Porta et al. (1998) to 
control for the possibility of insider trading activities. We find that neither of these two 
variables is significant, yet, our core findings regarding the impact of MLS on announcement 
abnormal returns remain unchanged. 
Third, we also replicate our baseline regressions by including interactions of different 
deal characteristics, such as cross-border deals with high-tech industry, cross-border deals 
with target‟s ownership status (public, private and subsidiary) and diversifying acquisition 
                                                          
25
 Although it is not the focus of our study, we test the voting power of different types of the second largest 
shareholder in family controlled and non-family controlled firms following Attig et al. (2008). Our results show 
the voting power has a significant positive impact on bidder CAR2 when the second largest shareholder is state. 
This result is consistent with Attig et al. (2008), who record a negative relation between the cost of equity 
capital and the voting power of state as a second largest shareholder. In addition, we replicate our baseline 
regression by further controlling for the impact of excess control (deviation voting rights from dividend rights of 
the largest shareholder) following (Attig et al., 2008; Guedhami and Mishra, 2008). Although we do not find 
significant impact of excess control on bidder CAR2, our core findings remain unaffected.  
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with target‟s ownership status. Our core findings – the positive and significant effect of our 
MLS proxies - remain unchanged.  
Fourth, we use the deal value relative to the market value of the bidder as the proxy for 
relative deal size in our main tests. Here, we use alternative proxies for relative deal size, 
such as: i) deal value scaled by book value of assets; ii) log of (1+ deal value scaled by 
market capitalization of the bidder) and iii) winsorized Deal Value to ACQ Value (at 1%) that 
winsorize the upper and lower five values of this variable. Results show our findings are not 
dependent on specific measure of the relative deal size.  
Fifth, Servaes (1991) find that hostile takeovers are associated with lower bidder 
returns. Therefore, we include an indicator variable for hostile takeovers. Although we do not 
find hostile takeovers have significant impacts on bidder returns, our findings regarding the 
effect of MLS are robust. To address this issue alternatively, we exclude acquisition 
announcements that are hostile in attitude. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged 
in using this sub-sample of firms. 
Sixth, we interact the method of payment with the ownership status of the target 
following Masulis et al. (2007) in our main tests. To mitigate the concern that these two 
controls themselves may have impacts on bidder returns respectively, we keep them 
separately. That is, we replace Public Target*Stock, Private Target*Stock and Subsidiary 
Target*Stock with Public Target, Subsidiary Target and Stock. Our main findings do not alter 
when we use these different controls. 
Finally, different countries have different number of observations in our sample. To 
better balance the country representation, we replicate our baseline regressions by excluding 
countries with: i) only 1 observation; ii) less than 3 observations; iii) less than 5 observations; 
iv) less than 7 observations and v) less than 9 observations. Results show our findings are 
robust to the increasing balance country representation of the sample. 
The results from these robustness tests reinforce our conclusion that MLS play an 
effective corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders. 
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7. CONCLUSION  
In this thesis, we aim to explore whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play a 
corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder 
and minority shareholders using market reactions to acquisition announcements made by the 
firms featuring large shareholder(s) in the ownership structure. In a sample of acquisition 
announcements made by firms with at least one large shareholder in the ownership structure, 
we find the presence of MLS, their voting power, their relative voting power, the number of 
blockholders and the relative voting power of these blockholders have a positive impact on 
bidder announcement period abnormal returns. This result continues to prevail after 
controlling for a set of effects, including bidder characteristics, deal characteristics, industry 
characteristics, legal institution proxies, year fixed effects and countries fixed effects. These 
findings are also robust after a series of robustness tests, addressing industry fixed effects, 
correlations between control variables, country, industry and bidder clustering, sensitivity to 
the choice of event windows, controls for investor protection of the target‟s country, 
alternative bidder returns measures and potential endogeneity issues. In addition, we also find 
evidence that disclosure requirement, the quality of investor protection, common-law legal 
origin and anti-self-dealing are important in protecting the rights of minority shareholders and 
market values the quality of these external institution environments.  
We contribute to the existing mergers and acquisitions literature by examining a 
different corporate governance device other than the one (number of ATPs used) discussed 
by Masulis et al. (2007). We also complement to the extant ownership structure literature, 
especially the literature related to MLS ownership structure. Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first international study that investigates the role of MLS using merger 
and acquisition activities. Our findings regarding investor protection also provide references 
to the future investor protection studies.  
Last but not least, our database limits us to focus on Western European and East Asian 
countries only. When data become available in the future, later research may continue to be 
done with a more extensive international focus. Although we uphold the hypothesis that MLS 
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structure does help reduce the agency problems between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders, we do not examine exactly how many large shareholders is most 
beneficial. This gives opportunities for future studies to examine the governance role of MLS 
in more detail. Besides, for the most important concern regarding ownership structure --- 
endogeneity, lack of enough time series data prevents us from conducting more dynamic 
models, such as panel tests to reach a more conclusive conclusion. Further research may 
consider tackling this issue more comprehensively. However, as we include a widespread of 
controls covering different potential effects and a battery of robustness tests to test the 
sensitivity of our findings, we are comfortable to confirm that MLS play an effective 
corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems based on our findings. Thus, 
corporate may consider promote such an ownership structure to better protect minority 
shareholders and benefit from good corporate governance. We also believe we make valuable 
contribution to the line of research related to MLS structure by highlighting this importance 
of MLS structure.  
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APPENDIX A.1 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Bidder Returns  
CAR2 (-2,+2) 
The accumulated market-model adjusted returns for the 
5-day event window (-2, +2) where market model 
parameters are estimated over the 200-day estimation 
period (-220, -21). 
Datastream, 
Author‟s Estimation 
Ownership Structure Variables 
Presence1 
Dummy variable: 1 for firms with a dominant 
shareholder of at least 10% voting rights, 0 otherwise. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
Presence2 
Dummy variable: 1 for firms with at least two large 
shareholders of at least 10% voting rights, 0 otherwise. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
Presence2345 
Number of large shareholders beyond the largest one 
that have at least 10% voting rights, up to 4. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
Vote2 
Size of voting rights of the second largest shareholder 
measured as the percentage of total votes outstanding. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
Vote2345 
Sum of the size of voting rights of all large shareholders 
other than the largest one: Vote2+Vote3+Vote4+Vote5. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
Vote2/1 Ratio 
The voting rights of the second largest shareholder 
relative to that of the dominant one: Vote2/Vote1. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
Vote2345/1 Ratio 
The sum of voting rights of all large shareholders other 
than the largest one relative to that of the dominant 
shareholder: (Vote2+Vote3+Vote4+Vote5)/Vote1. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
High_Diff 
Herfindahl index of the difference between the voting 
rights estimated as the maximum of ln[(Vote1-Vote2)
2 
+(Vote2-Vote3)
2
+(Vote3-Vote4)
2
+(Vote4-Vote5)
2
] or 0. 
Claessens et al. 
(2000), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), 
Author‟s Estimation 
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Bidder Characteristic Variables 
Firm Size Log of market capitalization. 
Worldscope, 
Author‟s Estimation 
Tobin‟s Q 
Market value of assets over book value of assets:  
(book value of assets – total common equity + market 
capitalization)/book value of assets. 
Worldscope, 
Author‟s Estimation 
Leverage  
Book value of debts (debts in current liability + 
long-term debts) over market value of total assets. 
Worldscope, 
Author‟s Estimation 
Free Cash Flow 
Operating income before depreciation– interest 
expenses – income taxes– capital expenditures, scaled 
by book value of total assets. 
Worldscope, 
Author‟s Estimation 
Price Runup 
Bidder‟s cumulative daily returns during the period 
(-220, -20). 
Datastream, 
Author‟s Estimation 
Deal Characteristic Variables 
Deal Value to ACQ 
Value 
The deal size (value offer) relative to the market value 
of the bidder. 
Worldscope, SDC 
Platinum, Author‟s 
Estimation 
Stock 
Dummy variable: 1 for deals that are paid stock (either 
purely or partially). 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Cross-border 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target and the bidder are from 
different countries, 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Private Target Dummy variable: 1 for private targets, 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Public Target Dummy variable: 1 for public targets, 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Subsidiary Target Dummy variable: 1 for subsidiary targets, 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Diversifying 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target and the bidder do not 
share the same Fama-French industry, 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
High_tech 
Indicator variables: 1 if both target and bidder are both 
from high tech industries defined by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Industry Characteristic Variables 
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Industry M&A 
Transaction value of all industry mergers based on 
Fama-French 48 industry groups divided by the total 
book value of total assets of all Global Vantage firms in 
the same Fama-French industry and year. 
 
Global Vantage, 
SDC Platinum,  
Author‟s Estimation 
Competitiveness 
Dummy variable: 1 if the bidder‟s industry is in the 
bottom quartile of all Fama-French 48 industries 
annually sorted according to Herfindahl index (sum of 
the square of the market share of the firm in Fama-French 
48 industries by year), 0 otherwise. 
Compustat, Author‟s 
Estimation 
Uniqueness 
Dummy variable: 1 if the bidder‟s industry is in the top 
quartile of all Fama-French 48 industries annually sorted 
by industry-median product uniqueness (selling 
expenses scaled by sales), 0 otherwise. 
Compustat, Author‟s 
Estimation 
Country Legal Institution Variables 
Disclosure 
Requirement  
Disclosure requirements index. It equals the arithmetic 
mean of: (1) Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3) 
Shareholders; (4) Inside ownership; (5) Contracts 
Irregular; (6) and Transactions.    
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Investor Protection 
Principal component of disclosure, liability standards, 
and Anti-director rights. Scale from 0 to 10. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Common-Law Legal 
Origin 
Dummy Variable: 0 if the country is a common law 
country, 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Anti-self-dealing Index 
Average of ex-ante (average of approval by disinterested 
shareholders and ex-ante disclosure) and ex-post 
(average of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of 
proving wrongdoing) private control of self-dealing. 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
Revised Anti-director 
Rights Index 
Aggregate index of shareholder rights. The index is the 
sum of: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not deposited; (3) 
cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) 
pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call a meeting. 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
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APPENDIX A.2 
Abnormal Returns Models 
i. Mean adjusted returns: ARi,t = Ri,t – ̅i 
where  ̅i is the simple average of bidder‟s daily returns during the (-220, -21) estimation 
period. 
ii. Market adjusted returns: ARi,t = Ri,t –Rm,t 
where Rm,t is returns on the country market portfolio for day t, which we use Datastream 
country market total return index for each country as the proxy. 
iii. Two-factor market model returns (multi-index model): ARi,t = Ri,t – âi – ûi Rm,t– ĝ Rw,t 
where Rm,t is returns on country market portfolio for day t (we use Datastream country market 
total return index for each country as the proxy for their respective market portfolio), Rw,t is 
returns on global market portfolio for day t (we use Datastream global market total return 
index as the proxy for global market portfolio) and âi, ûi and ĝ are two-factor market model 
parameters from the following equation over the estimation period (-220, -21):  
Ri,t = âi + ûi Rm,t + ĝ Rw,t + ŝi,t 
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Table 1A 
Summary Statistics of Bidder Returns (CAR2) by Country 
Country 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Bidder 
Returns (CAR2) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Finland 20 -0.0038  0.1222  
France 26 0.0082  0.0678  
Germany 11 0.0485  0.0748  
Hong Kong 13 -0.0299  0.2540  
Ireland 27 -0.0074  0.0674  
Italy 12 -0.0140  0.0558  
Japan 36 -0.0476  0.0857  
Malaysia 13 0.0138  0.0448  
Norway 18 -0.0073  0.0730  
Philippines 3 0.0308  0.0534  
Singapore 8 -0.0304  0.1243  
Spain 16 -0.0246  0.0788  
Sweden 32 -0.0598  0.0795  
Switzerland 10 0.0098  0.0622  
United Kingdom 537 -0.0089  0.0766  
Total 782 -0.0114 0.0842 
This table presents the summary statistics of bidder returns (CAR2) 
of the sample acquisition announcements by country. The sample is 
drawn from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. 
(2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio 
and Lang (2002). The bidder returns (CAR2) are the cumulative 
market-model adjusted returns for a 5-day event window (-2, +2) 
where market model parameters are estimated over a 200-day 
estimation period (-220, -21). 
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Table 1B 
Summary Statistics of Bidder Returns (CAR2) by Year 
Year 
Announced 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Bidder 
Returns (CAR2) 
Standard 
Deviation 
1996 138 -0.0059  0.0451  
1997 118 -0.0066  0.0613  
1998 155 -0.0156  0.0758  
1999 191 -0.0287  0.0809  
2000 180 0.0032  0.1202  
Total 782 -0.0114 0.0842 
This table presents the summary statistics of bidder returns (CAR2) of 
the sample acquisition announcements by year. The sample is drawn 
from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 
10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002). 
The bidder returns (CAR2) are the cumulative market-model adjusted 
returns for a 5-day event window (-2, +2) where market model 
parameters are estimated over a 200-day estimation period (-220, -21). 
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Table 2A 
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Ownership Structure Variables 
Presence1 782 0.71  0.45  0.00  1.00  1.00  
Presence2 782 0.31  0.46  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Presence2345 782 0.45  0.80  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Vote2 782 4.84  7.81  0.00  0.00  10.60  
Vote2345 782 6.64  11.81  0.00  0.00  11.00  
Vote2/1 782 0.21  0.34  0.00  0.00  0.40  
Vote2345/1 782 0.29  0.54  0.00  0.00  0.50  
High_diff 782 4.46  2.75  3.26  5.25  6.35  
Panel B: Bidder Characteristic Variables 
Firm Size 782 5.90  2.08  4.36  5.68  7.06  
Tobin's Q 782 2.48  3.32  1.19  1.66  2.40  
Free Cash Flow 782 0.09  0.25  0.05  0.10  0.15  
Leverage 782 0.13  0.14  0.03  0.09  0.18  
Price Runup 782 -0.09 0.41  -0.30 -0.08 0.13  
Panel C: Deal Characteristic Variables 
Deal Value to ACQ Value 782 0.41  1.24  0.02  0.10  0.36  
Stock  782 0.49  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Cross-border 782 0.37  0.48  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Private Target 782 0.48  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Public Target 782 0.32  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Subsidiary Target 782 0.19  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Diversifying 782 0.49  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  
High_tech Industry 782 0.09  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Panel D: Industry Characteristic Variables 
Industry M&A 782 0.06  0.12  0.01  0.02  0.06  
Uniqueness 782 0.33  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Competitiveness 782 0.32  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00  
This table presents the summary descriptive statistics for ownership structure variables, 
bidder characteristics control variables, deal characteristics control variables and industry 
characteristics control variables. The sample includes firms from 5 East Asian countries 
represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in 
Faccio and Lang (2002).  
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Presence2 0.43  
                      Presence2345 0.36  0.84  
                     Vote2 0.39  0.89  0.78  
                    Vote2345 0.34  0.80  0.94  0.89  
                   Vote2/1 0.35  0.85  0.71  0.82  0.73  
                  Vote2345/1 0.27  0.70  0.80  0.69  0.81  0.86  
                 High_diff 0.89  0.35  0.28  0.35  0.29  0.23  0.15  
                Firm Size -0.28  -0.23  -0.20  -0.21  -0.21  -0.23  -0.21  -0.21  
               Tobin's Q 0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.04  0.08  
              Free Cash Flow -0.05  -0.07  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.07  0.12  -0.52  
             Leverage 0.01  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.04  -0.27  -0.07  
            Deal Value to ACQ 
Value 
0.06  0.07  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.07  0.08  0.06  -0.17  0.01  -0.17  0.08  
           High_tech -0.04  -0.07  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.06  -0.05  0.01  0.10  0.31  0.04  -0.16  -0.05  
          Cross-border -0.09  -0.02  -0.04  -0.04  -0.06  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06  0.36  0.08  0.02  -0.01  -0.04  0.18  
         Diversifying 0.00  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.06  -0.03  -0.09  -0.04  -0.03  -0.06  0.01  -0.10  -0.05  
        Stock  -0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  -0.04  0.10  -0.10  0.05  0.19  0.09  -0.16  -0.16  
       Private Target 0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.39  0.07  0.02  -0.20  -0.12  0.08  -0.13  0.06  -0.02  
      Public Target -0.08  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.08  -0.07  -0.05  0.41  0.00  -0.03  0.17  0.13  -0.09  0.13  -0.05  0.11  -0.66  
     Subsidiary Target 0.06  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.00  -0.08  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.03  -0.11  -0.47  -0.33  
    Price Runup 0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  -0.11  -0.05  0.07  -0.12  -0.04  -0.04  0.02  -0.11  -0.07  0.05  0.03  
   Industry M&A 0.05  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.06  0.37  -0.24  -0.10  0.01  0.17  0.07  -0.05  0.18  0.03  -0.01  -0.05  -0.16  
  Competitiveness -0.04  -0.06  -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  -0.07  -0.05  -0.04  0.22  -0.08  0.04  0.13  0.01  -0.10  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.18  0.12  0.08  -0.01  -0.07  
 Uniqueness 0.01  0.01  -0.06  -0.02  -0.06  0.03  -0.03  0.02  -0.09  0.23  0.02  -0.26  -0.04  0.38  0.11  -0.05  0.08  0.14  -0.10  -0.05  -0.13  0.19  -0.35  
N 782 782 782 782 782 782 782 782 782 782   782 782   782  782  782  782 782  782  782  782 782   782   782 
This table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of variables. The sample includes firms from 5 East Asian and 10 Western European countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). 
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Table 3 
Univariate Tests of Difference in CAR2 with Ownership Structure 
Type 
Presence
1 
Presence
2 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Bidder 
Returns (CAR2) 
Standard 
Deviation 
T-stat 
Widely Held 0 0 228 -0.0092  0.0720  -5.9724  
SLS 1 0 310 -0.0199  0.0955  -12.8420  
MLS 1 1 244 -0.0027  0.0788  -1.9336  
Testing of the Mean Difference 
    CAR2(Difference) T-stat Significance Level  
SLS-Widely Held -0.0107    -1.4787  Not Significant 
MLS-SLS   0.0172    2.3209  5% Level 
This table presents the univariate tests of the difference in bidder returns (CAR2) between firms that 
are widely-held, with single large shareholder (SLS) and with multiple large shareholder structure 
(MLS). The sample includes firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) 
and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002). The bidder returns 
(CAR2) are the cumulative market-model adjusted returns for a 5-day event window (-2, +2) where 
market model parameters are estimated over a 200-day estimation period (-220, -21). 
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Table 4A 
Bidder Returns and Bidder’s Ownership Structure 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence1 -0.0119* -0.0099 -0.0113 -0.0073 -0.0039 
 
 
(-1.673) (-1.508) (-1.596) (-1.111) (-0.543) 
 Presence2 0.0180** 0.0166** 
   
0.0169** 
 
(2.463) (2.300) 
   
(2.311) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size 
    
0.0007 
 
     
(0.276) 
 Tobin's Q 
    
-0.0016 
 
     
(-0.545) 
 Free Cash Flow 
    
-0.0494 
 
     
(-0.470) 
 Leverage 
    
-0.0871* 
 
     
(-1.915) 
 Price Runup 
    
-0.0374** 
 
     
(-2.555) 
 Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value 
    
-0.0104 
 
     
(-1.042) 
 High_tech 
    
0.0044 
 
     
(0.275) 
 Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 
    
0.0126 
 
     
(0.570) 
 Cross-border 
    
0.0078 
 
     
(0.868) 
 Diversifying 
    
0.0109 
 
     
(1.541) 
 Private Target*Stock   
    
0.0054 
 
     
(0.479) 
 Public Target*Stock  
    
0.0380*** 
 
     
(2.989) 
 Subsidiary Target*Stock  
    
-0.0008 
 
     
(-0.035) 
 Industry Characteristics  
Industry M&A 
    
-0.0352 
 
     
(-0.814) 
 Competitiveness 
    
-0.0043 
 
     
(-0.587) 
 Uniqueness 
    
-0.0154* 
 
     
(-1.757) 
 Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0067 0.0111 0.0007 0.0031 0.0085 -0.0030 
 
(0.733) (1.155) (0.068) (0.277) (0.314) (-0.265) 
Observations 782 782 538 538 538 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.040 0.009 0.028 0.069 0.028 
F-test (p-value) 0.0028 0.0000 0.0399 0.0013 0.0000 0.0008 
This table presents relationship between bidder returns (CAR2) and the presence of single large shareholder (SLS) 
and multiple large shareholders (MLS) in the ownership structure. The sample includes acquisitions announcement 
made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European 
countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder announcement period abnormal 
returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market 
index using returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on 
robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 4B 
Baseline Regressions: Bidder Returns and MLS in Bidder’s Ownership Structure 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0189** 
      
 
(2.349) 
      Vote2 
 
0.0009* 
     
  
(1.952) 
     Vote2/1 Ratio 
  
0.0203** 
    
   
(1.969) 
    Presence2345 
   
0.0087* 
   
    
(1.723) 
   Vote2345 
    
0.0005 
  
     
(1.609) 
  Vote2345/1 Ratio 
     
0.0137** 
 
      
(2.001) 
 High_diff 
      
-0.0045 
       
(-1.105) 
Bidder Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.0033 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 0.0031 0.0032 0.0026 
 
(1.244) (1.152) (1.177) (1.197) (1.161) (1.207) (1.012) 
Tobin's Q -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0039* -0.0038 -0.0039* -0.0039* 
 
(-1.584) (-1.577) (-1.633) (-1.664) (-1.633) (-1.682) (-1.656) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0477* -0.0482* -0.0497* -0.0499* -0.0495* -0.0504* -0.0502* 
 
(-1.709) (-1.723) (-1.786) (-1.796) (-1.778) (-1.818) (-1.793) 
Leverage -0.0668** -0.0639** -0.0657** -0.0654** -0.0641** -0.0666** -0.0641** 
 
(-2.088) (-1.986) (-2.038) (-2.037) (-1.995) (-2.066) (-1.971) 
Price Runup -0.0426*** -0.0427*** -0.0425*** -0.0427*** -0.0425*** -0.0423*** -0.0431*** 
 
(-3.454) (-3.444) (-3.441) (-3.450) (-3.425) (-3.424) (-3.441) 
Deal Characteristics   
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0012 
 
(-0.229) (-0.265) (-0.257) (-0.269) (-0.287) (-0.267) (-0.235) 
High_tech 0.0226 0.0217 0.0212 0.0214 0.0211 0.0204 0.0187 
 
(1.120) (1.074) (1.051) (1.067) (1.049) (1.013) (0.923) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0130 0.0140 0.0145 0.0127 0.0134 0.0139 0.0150 
 
(0.788) (0.843) (0.872) (0.778) (0.814) (0.838) (0.898) 
Cross-border 0.0052 0.0062 0.0061 0.0064 0.0068 0.0067 0.0067 
 
(0.557) (0.675) (0.663) (0.698) (0.739) (0.739) (0.729) 
Diversifying -0.0032 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0036 
 
(-0.434) (-0.499) (-0.430) (-0.468) (-0.487) (-0.441) (-0.493) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0033 0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0042 0.0044 0.0042 
 
(0.323) (0.383) (0.395) (0.393) (0.416) (0.435) (0.412) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0323*** 0.0329*** 0.0332*** 0.0330*** 0.0331*** 0.0331*** 0.0338*** 
 
(2.808) (2.859) (2.896) (2.887) (2.893) (2.911) (2.933) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0248 -0.0256 -0.0251 -0.0263 -0.0263 -0.0261 -0.0234 
 
(-1.141) (-1.166) (-1.155) (-1.192) (-1.189) (-1.190) (-1.105) 
Industry Characteristics     
Industry M&A -0.0270 -0.0227 -0.0236 -0.0242 -0.0224 -0.0223 -0.0188 
 
(-0.668) (-0.558) (-0.573) (-0.600) (-0.553) (-0.544) (-0.456) 
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Competitiveness -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0020 
 
(-0.122) (-0.200) (-0.189) (-0.161) (-0.210) (-0.195) (-0.293) 
Uniqueness -0.0197** -0.0194** -0.0204** -0.0180** -0.0183** -0.0191** -0.0196** 
 
(-2.193) (-2.165) (-2.267) (-1.996) (-2.041) (-2.125) (-2.178) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0016 0.0045 0.0051 0.0038 0.0046 0.0045 0.0393 
 
(0.063) (0.184) (0.209) (0.156) (0.187) (0.186) (1.317) 
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.085 
This table presents relationship between bidder returns (CAR2) and MLS with a sample of firms that have at least one large shareholder. 
The sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 
Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder announcement period abnormal 
returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market index using returns for 
-21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the 
parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Bidder Returns, Legal Institutions and MLS in Bidder’s Ownership Structure 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0221*** 0.0213*** 0.0211*** 0.0213*** 0.0210*** 
 
(2.866) (2.713) (2.673) (2.713) (2.641) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size 0.0031 0.0036 0.0035 0.0035 0.0030 
 
(1.447) (1.617) (1.590) (1.595) (1.341) 
Tobin's Q -0.0035 -0.0039* -0.0038* -0.0039* -0.0037 
 
(-1.563) (-1.711) (-1.677) (-1.691) (-1.647) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0456* -0.0498* -0.0488* -0.0492* -0.0479* 
 
(-1.684) (-1.802) (-1.780) (-1.791) (-1.739) 
Leverage -0.0721** -0.0706** -0.0709** -0.0713** -0.0715** 
 
(-2.331) (-2.296) (-2.300) (-2.310) (-2.287) 
Price Runup -0.0426*** -0.0416*** -0.0419*** -0.0423*** -0.0423*** 
 
(-3.639) (-3.568) (-3.586) (-3.604) (-3.586) 
Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 
(-0.163) (-0.160) (-0.166) (-0.154) (-0.171) 
High_tech 0.0340* 0.0338* 0.0335* 0.0330* 0.0328* 
 
(1.851) (1.848) (1.848) (1.822) (1.809) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0055 0.0069 0.0068 0.0066 0.0081 
 
(0.517) (0.663) (0.651) (0.639) (0.806) 
Cross-border 0.0059 0.0061 0.0054 0.0061 0.0060 
 
(0.682) (0.700) (0.633) (0.704) (0.679) 
Diversifying -0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0038 
 
(-0.531) (-0.548) (-0.507) (-0.513) (-0.509) 
Private Target*Stock   0.0036 0.0028 0.0040 0.0034 0.0028 
 
(0.390) (0.297) (0.431) (0.366) (0.305) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0294*** 0.0303*** 0.0314*** 0.0308*** 0.0296*** 
 
(2.600) (2.677) (2.762) (2.726) (2.613) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0283 -0.0295 -0.0271 -0.0279 -0.0308 
 
(-1.284) (-1.364) (-1.225) (-1.274) (-1.450) 
Industry Characteristics 
Industry M&A -0.0242 -0.0271 -0.0279 -0.0272 -0.0244 
 
(-0.615) (-0.680) (-0.704) (-0.688) (-0.611) 
Competitiveness 0.0033 0.0032 0.0023 0.0025 0.0025 
 
(0.451) (0.442) (0.308) (0.335) (0.339) 
Uniqueness -0.0219** -0.0216** -0.0213** -0.0215** -0.0213** 
 
(-2.428) (-2.392) (-2.373) (-2.387) (-2.365) 
Legal Institutions 
Disclosure Requirement 0.0743* 
    
 
(1.729) 
    Investor Protection 
 
0.0480* 
   
  
(1.787) 
   Common-Law Legal Origin 
  
0.0213** 
  
   
(1.995) 
  Anti-self-dealing Index 
   
0.0375** 
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(2.007) 
 Revised Anti-director Rights 
    
0.0092 
     
(1.490) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect No No No No No 
Constant -0.0639 -0.0385 -0.0218 -0.0365 -0.0464 
 
(-1.605) (-1.383) (-0.902) (-1.328) (-1.258) 
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.085 
This table presents the relationship between bidder returns (CAR2) and the presence of a second largest 
shareholder after controlling for the proxies for country-level investor protection quality. The sample includes 
acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) 
and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder 
announcement period abnormal returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market 
model with Datastream country market index using returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are 
defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *, 
**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6A 
Bidder Returns and MLS in Bidder’s Ownership Structure of Different Countries 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample 
United 
Kingdom 
Western 
Europe 
Western Europe 
& East Asia 
Complete 
Sample 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0264*** 0.0183** 0.0189** 0.0188** 
 
(2.716) (2.206) (2.349) (2.336) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size 0.0032 0.0024 0.0033 0.0033 
 
(1.003) (0.908) (1.244) (1.223) 
Tobin's Q -0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0037 
 
(-0.562) (-1.137) (-1.584) (-1.582) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0123 -0.0246 -0.0477* -0.0475* 
 
(-0.478) (-1.149) (-1.709) (-1.698) 
Leverage -0.0733* -0.0564* -0.0668** -0.0678** 
 
(-1.701) (-1.658) (-2.088) (-2.133) 
Price Runup -0.0202 -0.0341** -0.0426*** -0.0427*** 
 
(-1.400) (-2.569) (-3.454) (-3.475) 
Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 
(-0.025) (-0.126) (-0.229) (-0.229) 
High_tech 0.0056 0.0125 0.0226 0.0226 
 
(0.236) (0.605) (1.120) (1.118) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0046 0.0224 0.0130 0.0127 
 
(0.165) (0.637) (0.788) (0.774) 
Cross-border -0.0051 0.0031 0.0052 0.0053 
 
(-0.462) (0.332) (0.557) (0.570) 
Diversifying -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0031 
 
(-0.138) (-0.252) (-0.434) (-0.421) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0022 0.0019 0.0033 0.0035 
 
(0.214) (0.199) (0.323) (0.347) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0383*** 0.0319*** 0.0323*** 0.0327*** 
 
(2.713) (2.631) (2.808) (2.875) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0106 -0.0282 -0.0248 -0.0239 
 
(-0.373) (-1.486) (-1.141) (-1.116) 
Industry Characteristics 
Industry M&A 0.0023 -0.0116 -0.0270 -0.0257 
 
(0.050) (-0.304) (-0.668) (-0.638) 
Competitiveness -0.0079 -0.0026 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 
(-0.930) (-0.351) (-0.122) (-0.125) 
Uniqueness -0.0256*** -0.0188** -0.0197** -0.0198** 
 
(-2.693) (-2.117) (-2.193) (-2.203) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0078 0.0068 0.0016 0.0012 
 
(0.325) (0.333) (0.063) (0.050) 
Observations 377 498 554 562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.090 0.092 0.226 
This table presents the impact of the presence of a second largest shareholder on bidder returns (CAR2) of 
different samples with different countries. Bidder announcement period abnormal returns (CAR2) are 
estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market index using 
returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 6B 
Univariate Tests for Regional Analysis of Bidder CAR2 and MLS structure 
  Ownership Type Difference 
  SLS MLS MLS-SLS T-stat 
Significance 
Level 
East Asia -0.0389  0.0143  0.0532  1.8275  10% 
N 37 19   
   Western Europe -0.0173  -0.0041  0.0132  1.7958  10% 
N 273 225         
This table presents the univariate tests of East Asian region and Western European 
region. The sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian 
countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries 
represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder announcement 
period abnormal returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using 
market model with Datastream country market index using returns for -21 to -220 days.  
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Table 7 
Robustness Tests with Industry Fixed Effects 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0215** 
      
 
(2.441) 
      Vote2 
 
0.0012** 
     
  
(2.342) 
     Vote2/1 Ratio 
  
0.0243** 
    
   
(2.105) 
    Presence2345 
   
0.0102* 
   
    
(1.954) 
   Vote2345 
    
0.0007** 
  
     
(2.058) 
  Vote2345/1 Ratio 
     
0.0171** 
 
      
(2.245) 
 High_diff 
      
-0.0046 
       
(-1.049) 
Bidder Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.0047 0.0044 0.0044 0.0046 0.0045 0.0046 0.0036 
 
(1.557) (1.487) (1.475) (1.495) (1.488) (1.519) (1.227) 
Tobin's Q -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0043* -0.0046* -0.0045* -0.0046* -0.0044* 
 
(-1.648) (-1.627) (-1.674) (-1.772) (-1.730) (-1.766) (-1.705) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0536* -0.0536* -0.0554* -0.0570* -0.0562* -0.0574* -0.0557* 
 
(-1.676) (-1.673) (-1.736) (-1.793) (-1.767) (-1.806) (-1.738) 
Leverage -0.0979*** -0.0954*** -0.0971*** -0.0967*** -0.0959*** -0.0985*** -0.0943*** 
 
(-3.175) (-3.108) (-3.153) (-3.155) (-3.139) (-3.225) (-3.042) 
Price Runup -0.0433*** -0.0431*** -0.0429*** -0.0434*** -0.0429*** -0.0427*** -0.0437*** 
 
(-3.281) (-3.264) (-3.257) (-3.272) (-3.238) (-3.234) (-3.261) 
Deal Characteristics   
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0011 
 
(-0.212) (-0.249) (-0.232) (-0.246) (-0.272) (-0.242) (-0.206) 
High_tech 0.0393* 0.0389* 0.0376 0.0377* 0.0380* 0.0366 0.0342 
 
(1.721) (1.706) (1.648) (1.672) (1.680) (1.623) (1.505) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0179 0.0187 0.0193 0.0173 0.0179 0.0183 0.0193 
 
(1.020) (1.062) (1.091) (0.991) (1.021) (1.043) (1.090) 
Cross-border 0.0034 0.0044 0.0046 0.0044 0.0049 0.0051 0.0054 
 
(0.324) (0.430) (0.449) (0.425) (0.475) (0.497) (0.529) 
Diversifying 0.0011 0.0006 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003 
 
(0.151) (0.078) (0.132) (0.062) (0.048) (0.098) (0.040) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0051 0.0057 0.0056 0.0058 0.0062 0.0062 0.0054 
 
(0.519) (0.588) (0.574) (0.592) (0.635) (0.635) (0.548) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0323** 0.0327** 0.0331** 0.0327** 0.0328** 0.0328** 0.0330** 
 
(2.478) (2.521) (2.553) (2.524) (2.542) (2.551) (2.531) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0193 -0.0202 -0.0195 -0.0208 -0.0209 -0.0206 -0.0176 
 
(-0.855) (-0.884) (-0.863) (-0.906) (-0.911) (-0.903) (-0.796) 
Industry Characteristics     
Industry M&A -0.0111 -0.0058 -0.0073 -0.0094 -0.0067 -0.0071 -0.0041 
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(-0.239) (-0.124) (-0.154) (-0.203) (-0.143) (-0.151) (-0.086) 
Competitiveness -0.0156 -0.0169 -0.0180 -0.0150 -0.0155 -0.0162 -0.0171 
 
(-0.635) (-0.689) (-0.735) (-0.599) (-0.623) (-0.657) (-0.691) 
Uniqueness 0.0318 0.0333 0.0340 0.0383 0.0383 0.0361 0.0383 
 
(0.805) (0.841) (0.876) (0.942) (0.935) (0.910) (0.991) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0194 -0.0176 -0.0160 -0.0176 -0.0181 -0.0173 0.0208 
 
(-0.700) (-0.639) (-0.587) (-0.631) (-0.649) (-0.622) (0.609) 
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.097 0.095 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.087 
This table presents relationship between bidder returns (CAR2) and ownership structure variables related to the presence and the 
power of MLS with a sample of firms that have at least one large shareholder after further controlling for industry fixed effects. The 
sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 
Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder announcement period abnormal 
returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market index using 
returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Robustness Tests with Different Proxies for Control Variables 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0179** 0.0183** 0.0189** 0.0190** 0.0209** 0.0192** 0.0185** 
 
(2.219) (2.312) (2.364) (2.366) (2.499) (2.391) (2.358) 
Bidder Characteristics   
Firm Size 
  
0.0029 0.0021 0.0026 0.0019 0.0020 
   
(1.042) (0.760) (0.938) (0.645) (0.792) 
Log Assets 0.0011 
      
 
(0.399) 
      Log Sales 
 
0.0024 
     
  
(0.823) 
     Tobin's Q -0.0032 -0.0021 
  
-0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0037 
 
(-1.305) (-0.896) 
  
(-0.743) (-0.611) (-1.579) 
Tobin's Q_W 
  
-0.0028 
    
   
(-1.148) 
    Market-to-book Value 
   
-0.0001 
   
    
(-1.034) 
   Free Cash Flow -0.0420 -0.1058 -0.0243 -0.0184 
  
-0.0524* 
 
(-1.484) (-1.141) (-1.406) (-1.145) 
  
(-1.863) 
ROA 
    
-0.0288 
  
     
(-1.294) 
  Cash & Cash Equivalent 
     
0.0187 
 
      
(0.684) 
 Leverage -0.0694** -0.0699** -0.0608* -0.0503* -0.0550* -0.0479 -0.0637** 
 
(-2.104) (-2.112) (-1.962) (-1.726) (-1.819) (-1.579) (-2.157) 
Price Runup -0.0425*** -0.0411*** -0.0417*** -0.0400*** -0.0392*** -0.0387*** -0.0450*** 
 
(-3.445) (-3.449) (-3.443) (-3.329) (-3.303) (-3.310) (-3.617) 
Deal Characteristics   
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0006 
 
 
(-0.311) (-0.296) (-0.189) (-0.200) (-0.152) (-0.119) 
 Deal Value to ACQ Value_W 
      
-0.0113 
       
(-1.072) 
High_tech 0.0231 0.0205 0.0196 0.0101 0.0119 0.0092 0.0212 
 
(1.148) (1.063) (0.988) (0.560) (0.639) (0.500) (1.055) 
Deal Value to ACQ 
Value*High_tech 
0.0128 0.0119 0.0142 0.0170 0.0164 0.0173 
 
 
(0.786) (0.761) (0.867) (1.058) (0.915) (1.080) 
 Deal Value to ACQ 
Value_W*High_tech       
0.0206 
       
(1.119) 
Cross-border 0.0078 0.0057 0.0056 0.0056 0.0028 0.0050 0.0064 
 
(0.856) (0.595) (0.602) (0.601) (0.294) (0.532) (0.732) 
Diversifying -0.0035 -0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0020 -0.0026 
 
(-0.465) (-0.355) (-0.402) (-0.354) (-0.505) (-0.267) (-0.362) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0022 0.0024 0.0034 0.0023 0.0017 0.0031 0.0040 
 
(0.218) (0.237) (0.333) (0.223) (0.158) (0.302) (0.393) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0346*** 0.0310** 0.0333*** 0.0320*** 0.0332*** 0.0327*** 0.0388*** 
 
(2.937) (2.536) (2.892) (2.762) (2.814) (2.811) (3.227) 
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Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0250 -0.0269 -0.0233 -0.0229 -0.0225 -0.0223 -0.0197 
 
(-1.150) (-1.305) (-1.057) (-1.034) (-0.938) (-0.995) (-0.995) 
Industry Characteristics   
Industry M&A -0.0247 -0.0212 -0.0315 -0.0388 -0.0218 -0.0166 -0.0317 
 
(-0.606) (-0.538) (-0.779) (-0.965) (-0.585) (-0.437) (-0.788) 
Competitiveness -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0009 
 
(-0.018) (0.102) (-0.173) (-0.141) (0.311) (-0.050) (-0.132) 
Uniqueness -0.0204** -0.0188** -0.0207** -0.0206** -0.0180* -0.0206** -0.0203** 
 
(-2.276) (-2.132) (-2.284) (-2.276) (-1.949) (-2.267) (-2.264) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0120 0.0081 -0.0012 -0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0082 0.0111 
 
(0.435) (0.312) (-0.050) (-0.216) (-0.248) (-0.339) (0.447) 
Observations 554 552 554 554 534 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.089 0.095 0.087 0.083 0.086 0.081 0.101 
This table presents the impact of the presence of a second largest shareholder on bidder returns (CAR2) with different control 
variable proxies. The sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in 
Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder 
returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market index using 
returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Robustness Tests with Clustering 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Clustering Country Industry Bidder  
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0189** 0.0189*** 0.0189** 
 
(2.807) (2.791) (2.296) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size 0.0033** 0.0033 0.0033 
 
(2.161) (1.336) (1.178) 
Tobin's Q -0.0037* -0.0037** -0.0037 
 
(-1.861) (-2.033) (-1.628) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0477 -0.0477* -0.0477* 
 
(-1.315) (-1.816) (-1.733) 
Leverage -0.0668*** -0.0668** -0.0668** 
 
(-4.068) (-2.107) (-2.002) 
Price Runup -0.0426** -0.0426*** -0.0426*** 
 
(-2.445) (-3.193) (-3.406) 
Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 
(-0.924) (-0.213) (-0.228) 
High_tech 0.0226 0.0226 0.0226 
 
(1.690) (1.405) (1.136) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0130** 0.0130* 0.0130 
 
(2.199) (1.890) (0.707) 
Cross-border 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 
 
(0.644) (0.483) (0.568) 
Diversifying -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032 
 
(-0.952) (-0.464) (-0.441) 
Private Target*Stock   0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 
 
(0.508) (0.266) (0.324) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0323*** 0.0323** 0.0323*** 
 
(4.670) (2.432) (2.820) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0248* -0.0248 -0.0248 
 
(-2.041) (-1.362) (-1.217) 
Industry Characteristics 
Industry M&A -0.0270 -0.0270 -0.0270 
 
(-0.773) (-1.154) (-0.695) 
Competitiveness -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 
(-0.138) (-0.098) (-0.120) 
Uniqueness -0.0197*** -0.0197** -0.0197** 
 
(-3.145) (-2.375) (-2.143) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 
 
(0.140) (0.085) (0.058) 
Observations 554 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.092 0.092 
This table presents the impact of the presence of a second largest shareholder on bidder returns (CAR2) after 
correcting the standard errors of regression coefficients for country, industry and bidder clustering. The 
sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in 
Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 
1996 and 2000. Bidder returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model 
with Datastream country market index using returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined 
in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering are presented inside 
the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Robustness Tests with Different Event Windows 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Event Window (-5, +5) (-4, +4) (-3, +3) (-1, +1) (0, +2) (0, +1) 
Dependent Variable CAR5 CAR4 CAR3 CAR1 CAR02 CAR01 
Presence2 0.0198** 0.0200** 0.0151* 0.0152** 0.0143* 0.0120* 
 
(2.077) (2.288) (1.828) (2.241) (1.918) (1.866) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size -0.0004 0.0013 0.0007 0.0032 0.0032 0.0027 
 
(-0.124) (0.467) (0.250) (1.473) (1.285) (1.315) 
Tobin's Q -0.0015 -0.0033 -0.0038 -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0023* 
 
(-0.352) (-1.444) (-1.426) (-0.969) (-1.270) (-1.653) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0275 -0.0413 -0.0461 -0.0243 -0.0331 -0.0312* 
 
(-0.714) (-1.618) (-1.598) (-1.432) (-1.321) (-1.860) 
Leverage -0.0087 -0.0261 -0.0499 -0.0592** -0.0502 -0.0546* 
 
(-0.212) (-0.862) (-1.558) (-2.062) (-1.615) (-1.911) 
Price Runup -0.0705*** -0.0606*** -0.0500*** -0.0334*** -0.0381*** -0.0280*** 
 
(-4.625) (-4.335) (-3.857) (-3.511) (-3.426) (-3.150) 
Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value 0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0061* -0.0017 -0.0069** 
 
(0.165) (-0.273) (-0.069) (-1.812) (-0.327) (-2.086) 
High_tech 0.0280 0.0238 0.0277 0.0034 0.0056 0.0022 
 
(0.961) (1.003) (1.281) (0.216) (0.309) (0.156) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0053 0.0055 0.0111 0.0142 0.0299* 0.0201* 
 
(0.357) (0.351) (0.731) (1.248) (1.843) (1.712) 
Cross-border 0.0055 0.0099 0.0061 0.0051 0.0005 0.0022 
 
(0.475) (0.923) (0.607) (0.605) (0.056) (0.275) 
Diversifying -0.0057 -0.0040 -0.0064 -0.0029 -0.0058 -0.0058 
 
(-0.635) (-0.506) (-0.821) (-0.465) (-0.867) (-1.006) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0051 0.0017 -0.0034 0.0010 0.0032 0.0014 
 
(0.415) (0.157) (-0.328) (0.114) (0.342) (0.173) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0322** 0.0307** 0.0286** 0.0201** 0.0272** 0.0205** 
 
(2.180) (2.216) (2.181) (2.152) (2.563) (2.353) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0261 -0.0254 -0.0315 -0.0301* -0.0163 -0.0224 
 
(-1.196) (-1.182) (-1.529) (-1.875) (-0.748) (-1.347) 
Industry Characteristics   
Industry M&A -0.0975 -0.0465 -0.0161 -0.0085 -0.0048 -0.0005 
 
(-1.511) (-0.833) (-0.298) (-0.250) (-0.139) (-0.017) 
Competitiveness -0.0072 -0.0058 -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0033 0.0024 
 
(-0.786) (-0.735) (-0.171) (-0.083) (0.510) (0.424) 
Uniqueness -0.0239** -0.0173* -0.0178* -0.0134* -0.0137* -0.0104 
 
(-2.161) (-1.710) (-1.833) (-1.703) (-1.714) (-1.462) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0314 0.0180 0.0214 -0.0069 -0.0016 0.0032 
 
(1.211) (0.750) (0.883) (-0.396) (-0.073) (0.197) 
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.099 0.092 0.099 0.074 0.092 
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This table presents the impact of the presence of a second largest shareholder on bidder returns (CAR2) with different event 
windows. The sample includes acquisitions announcement made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in 
Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. 
Bidder returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market 
index using returns for -21 to -220 days. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 11 
Robustness Tests with Investor Protection of Target’s Country 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0185** 0.0183** 0.0183** 0.0190** 0.0193** 
 
(2.317) (2.290) (2.289) (2.337) (2.373) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size 0.0033 0.0032 0.0032 0.0034 0.0036 
 
(1.240) (1.204) (1.200) (1.258) (1.321) 
Tobin's Q -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0037 
 
(-1.601) (-1.584) (-1.575) (-1.586) (-1.603) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0483* -0.0478* -0.0473* -0.0475* -0.0480* 
 
(-1.721) (-1.704) (-1.690) (-1.702) (-1.721) 
Leverage -0.0664** -0.0661** -0.0664** -0.0667** -0.0675** 
 
(-2.097) (-2.086) (-2.076) (-2.089) (-2.103) 
Price Runup -0.0419*** -0.0418*** -0.0417*** -0.0418*** -0.0417*** 
 
(-3.307) (-3.284) (-3.277) (-3.321) (-3.334) 
Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 
(-0.230) (-0.221) (-0.222) (-0.219) (-0.211) 
High_tech 0.0252 0.0253 0.0249 0.0238 0.0232 
 
(1.200) (1.217) (1.205) (1.165) (1.139) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0074 0.0064 0.0068 0.0128 0.0160 
 
(0.261) (0.227) (0.243) (0.775) (0.926) 
Cross-border 0.0043 0.0045 0.0056 0.0085 0.0129 
 
(0.458) (0.485) (0.614) (0.832) (1.204) 
Diversifying -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0029 -0.0030 
 
(-0.370) (-0.344) (-0.336) (-0.387) (-0.400) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0031 0.0030 0.0033 0.0038 0.0044 
 
(0.303) (0.295) (0.318) (0.372) (0.426) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0324*** 0.0324*** 0.0328*** 0.0331*** 0.0335*** 
 
(2.797) (2.798) (2.845) (2.866) (2.856) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0259 -0.0251 -0.0249 -0.0252 -0.0257 
 
(-1.187) (-1.150) (-1.137) (-1.134) (-1.158) 
Industry Characteristics 
Industry M&A -0.0266 -0.0266 -0.0264 -0.0265 -0.0265 
 
(-0.659) (-0.660) (-0.658) (-0.659) (-0.660) 
Competitiveness -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 
(-0.149) (-0.132) (-0.112) (-0.147) (-0.142) 
Uniqueness -0.0198** -0.0197** -0.0197** -0.0197** -0.0193** 
 
(-2.191) (-2.182) (-2.177) (-2.189) (-2.131) 
Target's Legal Institutions 
Disclosure Requirement -0.0022 
    
 
(-0.063) 
    Investor Protection 
 
0.0076 
   
  
(0.321) 
   Common-Law Legal Origin 
  
0.0061 
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(0.466) 
  Anti-self-dealing Index 
   
0.0135 
 
    
(0.667) 
 Revised Anti-director Rights 
    
0.0066 
     
(1.158) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0039 -0.0119 -0.0337 
 
(0.107) (-0.119) (-0.136) (-0.347) (-0.817) 
Observations 549 549 549 552 552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.091 0.092 
This table presents the relationship between bidder returns (CAR2) and the presence of a second 
largest shareholder after controlling for the proxies for country investor protection environment of the 
target. The sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries 
represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and 
Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder returns (CAR2) are estimated over the event window (-2, 
+2) using market model with Datastream country market index using returns for -21 to -220 days. All 
control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 12 
Robustness Tests with Different Models for Bidder Returns 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification 
Mean 
Adjusted  
Market 
Adjusted  
Two-factor Market 
Model 
Estimation Window 
(-210, -11) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0195** 0.0193** 0.0193** 0.0187** 
 
(2.414) (2.374) (2.397) (2.328) 
Bidder Characteristics 
Firm Size 0.0043 0.0036 0.0032 0.0036 
 
(1.526) (1.323) (1.197) (1.339) 
Tobin's Q -0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0036 
 
(-1.187) (-1.506) (-1.573) (-1.549) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0388 -0.0442 -0.0469* -0.0497* 
 
(-1.390) (-1.599) (-1.676) (-1.779) 
Leverage -0.0464 -0.0663** -0.0663** -0.0649** 
 
(-1.456) (-1.984) (-2.083) (-2.019) 
Price Runup -0.0427*** -0.0177 -0.0407*** -0.0418*** 
 
(-3.194) (-1.460) (-3.281) (-3.386) 
Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value to ACQ Value -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0011 
 
(-0.103) (-0.141) (-0.231) (-0.205) 
High_tech 0.0232 0.0196 0.0215 0.0222 
 
(1.119) (0.989) (1.065) (1.098) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0293 0.0166 0.0184 0.0103 
 
(1.616) (1.013) (1.111) (0.630) 
Cross-border 0.0009 0.0038 0.0052 0.0047 
 
(0.090) (0.401) (0.563) (0.510) 
Diversifying -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0034 
 
(-0.150) (-0.232) (-0.366) (-0.463) 
Private Target*Stock  0.0045 0.0043 0.0037 0.0032 
 
(0.435) (0.418) (0.364) (0.317) 
Public Target*Stock  0.0298** 0.0323*** 0.0330*** 0.0324*** 
 
(2.557) (2.746) (2.876) (2.826) 
Subsidiary Target*Stock  -0.0324 -0.0187 -0.0245 -0.0237 
 
(-1.464) (-0.866) (-1.131) (-1.092) 
Industry Characteristics 
Industry M&A -0.0240 -0.0198 -0.0268 -0.0284 
 
(-0.616) (-0.505) (-0.643) (-0.688) 
Competitiveness 0.0007 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0009 
 
(0.107) (0.319) (-0.031) (-0.135) 
Uniqueness -0.0179** -0.0198** -0.0186** -0.0189** 
 
(-1.991) (-2.170) (-2.078) (-2.110) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0111 -0.0041 0.0019 -0.0007 
 
(-0.445) (-0.169) (0.076) (-0.030) 
Observations 554 554 554 554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.061 0.093 0.089 
This table presents the impact of the presence of a second largest shareholder on bidder returns (CAR2) for different abnormal returns 
measures or estimation window. The sample includes acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries 
represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 
2000. Three different models and one different estimation period are used to estimate abnormal returns. Bidder returns (CAR2) are 
estimated over the event window (-2, +2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors 
are presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 13A 
Robustness Tests with Exogenous Control Variables 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 CAR2 
Presence2 0.0199** 
      
 
(2.420) 
      Vote2 
 
0.0009* 
     
  
(1.952) 
     Vote2/1 Ratio 
  
0.0206* 
    
   
(1.932) 
    Presence2345 
   
0.0083 
   
    
(1.586) 
   Vote2345 
    
0.0005 
  
     
(1.537) 
  Vote2345/1 Ratio 
     
0.0132* 
 
      
(1.883) 
 High_diff 
      
-0.0036 
       
(-0.837) 
Bidder Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.0038 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0037 0.0031 
 
(1.311) (1.238) (1.248) (1.227) (1.219) (1.250) (1.076) 
Industry Tobin's Q -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0014 
 
(-0.494) (-0.407) (-0.508) (-0.427) (-0.392) (-0.467) (-0.401) 
Industry Free Cash Flow 0.0206 0.0197 0.0207 0.0248 0.0233 0.0248 0.0238 
 
(0.203) (0.195) (0.203) (0.243) (0.229) (0.243) (0.234) 
Industry Leverage -0.0002 0.0040 0.0036 0.0021 0.0039 0.0037 0.0048 
 
(-0.003) (0.079) (0.071) (0.040) (0.078) (0.072) (0.095) 
Deal Characteristics   
Deal Value to ACQ Value 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017 
 
(0.302) (0.280) (0.291) (0.281) (0.271) (0.292) (0.311) 
High_tech 0.0112 0.0100 0.0093 0.0089 0.0088 0.0080 0.0062 
 
(0.635) (0.564) (0.526) (0.505) (0.497) (0.453) (0.344) 
Deal Value to ACQ Value*High_tech 0.0219 0.0232 0.0237 0.0222 0.0228 0.0232 0.0247* 
 
(1.551) (1.618) (1.647) (1.569) (1.598) (1.620) (1.686) 
Public Target 0.0215* 0.0219* 0.0218* 0.0220* 0.0221* 0.0219* 0.0209* 
 
(1.699) (1.712) (1.711) (1.719) (1.722) (1.719) (1.661) 
Private Target 0.0109 0.0113 0.0113 0.0109 0.0113 0.0113 0.0096 
 
(0.932) (0.951) (0.955) (0.920) (0.946) (0.957) (0.834) 
Industry Characteristics     
Industry M&A 0.0034 0.0074 0.0082 0.0062 0.0076 0.0087 0.0116 
 
(0.087) (0.187) (0.204) (0.158) (0.191) (0.217) (0.286) 
Competitiveness 0.0011 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 
 
(0.151) (0.071) (0.072) (0.067) (0.033) (0.033) (-0.045) 
Uniqueness -0.0130 -0.0128 -0.0134 -0.0116 -0.0118 -0.0124 -0.0129 
 
(-1.435) (-1.412) (-1.475) (-1.278) (-1.311) (-1.361) (-1.413) 
Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0281 -0.0263 -0.0248 -0.0258 -0.0260 -0.0256 0.0047 
 
(-0.835) (-0.784) (-0.745) (-0.756) (-0.766) (-0.761) (0.139) 
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.032 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.022 
This table presents the relationship between bidder returns (CAR2) and proxies for the presence and the power of MLS with a 
sample of firms that have at least one large shareholder and use most likely exogenous control variables. The sample includes 
acquisition announcements made by firms from 5 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 10 Western 
European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) between 1996 and 2000. Bidder returns (CAR2) are estimated 
over the event window (-2, +2) using market model with Datastream country market index using returns for -21 to -220 days. 
T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *, **, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 13B 
Robustness Tests with Instrumental Variables Approach 
Model Variables Instrument Wu-Hausman (p-value) 
(1) Presence2 iPresence2 0.7374  
(2) Vote2 iVote2 0.5976  
(3) Vote2/1 Ratio iVote2/1 Ratio 0.6510  
(4) Presence2345 iPresence2345 0.5921  
(5) Vote2345 iVote2345 0.5708  
(6) Vote2345/1 Ratio iVote2345/1 Ratio 0.3546  
(7) High_diff iHigh_diff 0.9871  
Test of endogeneity 
Null hypothesis: Variables are exogenous. 
This table summarizes the specifications of instrumental variables approach in 
addressing endogeneity issue. The p-value for Wu-Hausman test indicates 
whether the original variables are endogenous or not. 
 
